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PREFACE
The role of the Jews in the Russian revolutionary move-
ment has been the subject of considerable speculation on the
part of historians. It is generally agreed that the number of
Jews in the movement was far out of proportion to their numer-
ical representation in the country. A problem develops, how-
ever, when the role of the Jewish intelligentsia is discussed.
Because they embraced a policy of Russification, were fre-
quently brought up outside the Pale of Settlement, and rejected
the religion of their fellow Jews, the question arises as to
whether the members of the Jewish intelligentsia were then
Russians, or Jews, or perhaps a distinct group in the history
of Russia to be studied independently of the others. This
problem appears when an attempt is made to assess Martov 1 s
contribution to the revolutionary movement. Trotsky was once
asked if he regarded himself as a Jew or a Russian. He re-
plied: "Neither, I am a Social Democrat, and nothing else."
Martov mirht have answered in the same manner, but the historian
needs to know more than that. An examination of Martov'
s
writings suggests that his brand of social democracy was
strongly influenced by his Jewish background and that many of
the contradictions that appear in his revolutionary world view
can only be explained by reference to this influence.
The need for a 3tudy of this nature might be demonstrated
by the fact that no biography of Martov has ever been pub-
lished, no collection of his writings has appeared, and virtu-
ally none of these writings have ever b«en translated into
iv
English. The research problem in tracking down even the most
Important documents has thus been very challenging.
Only a handful of books havo been published about the
early development of Russian Social Democracy; of these, most
are totally inadequate for an understanding of this chase of
the Russian revolutionary movement. Some exceptions to this
are: Leopold Haimson's Tjje. Russian Marxists anji £&£ Origins
of. Bolshevism : F. I. Dan»s Proiskhozhdenie Rol'shevizma....
an amazingly objective study considering that Dan was Martov's
brother-in-law and one of his close companions; and Bertram
Wolfe's Three Who Made a. Revolution . As a result, this re-
searcher has had to rely on evidence obtained chiefly from
primary sources—th t is, the polemical writings and memoirs
of Yuri Martov—available in this country through the inter-
library loan system for the core of this study.
While this thesis will be focused on certain specific
questions relating to Martov's revolutionary career from 1890
to 1907 and will not be aimed at presenting a broad survey of
the era, some attention will be paid to the complex of ideas
identifiably held by the Jewish intelligentsia and its rela-
tion to the whole Russian revolutionary movement.
The transliteration used in this thesis is that utilized
by the Harvard Russian Research Center. The dates cited,
where important to the understanding of the event, have not
been changed from the old Julian Calandar.
CHAPTER I
MARTOV AND THE JEWISH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
The major theme of the Jews in Russia from the partitions
of Poland (1772-1795) to the present has been the struggle for
emancipation. Before this date there were few Jews in Russia.
In the sixteenth century, when the Moscovite princes began
uniting the independent principalities into a Russian State,
no Jews were permitted to reside within its boundaries. The
reasons for this were originally of a religious character. N.
Varadinov, official historian of the Ministry of Interior
during the reign of Nicholas I, refers to the fear of Jewish
influence on Russian Orthodoxy in the following observation:
The history of Jewish affairs since 16\9 bears the
stamp of distrust toward the followers of the Mosaic
faith. One of the reasons for this attitude I:- the
fact that Jews, through their false teachings, have
lured to their religion adherents of other faiths,
even thos~ of the Christian persuasion. Because of
this, their civic rights were constantly limited and
their immigration from oth<=>r countries forbidden.
On several occasions they were completely driven out
from Russia.-*-
From the origin of the Moscovite stale until the reign of
Catharine II, the policy of keeping the Jews out of Russia was
maintained. As a result of the first partition of Poland how-
ever, Russia gained a Jewish population of two hundred thousand.
By 1795, as other Polish-Lithuanian lands were annexed to
^klited in Louis Greenberg, The Jews in Russia (2 vols.;
New Haven: Yale University Press, 19¥f ) , I, 7. Mr. Greenberg
asserts that Varadinov's claim that the Jews prosezLyted Chris-
tians was ridiculous.
Russia, the number of Jews reached nine hundred thousand.?
Since it seemed impossible to banish this many Jews from
Russian soil, the program of the eovernm-nt was to restrict
the Jews to the area extractor! from Poland and Lithuania* In
a series of discriminatory legislative acts, culminating in
the ukaz of 1791 when the Jews were s; ecifically barred from
certain areas, the Jewish Pale of Settlement was officially
established.
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Despite the promise of reform of the official state posi-
tion during the reign of Alexander I, the Jews were to be
disappointed. After the Congress of Vienna Alexander was less
willing to make liberal concessions to the Russian people, let
alone the alien Jews.
In 1835, during the reign of Nicholas I, a new code of
regulations was issued which clearly defined the Pale of Set-
tlement and confirmed all previous anti-Jewish legislation.
The Pale consisted of the Lithuanian provinces of Kovno, Vilno,
Grodno, and Minsk; the southwestern provinces of Vohlyn and
Podol; Vitebsk and Mogilev in White Russia; Chernigov and
Poltave excluding the crown villages in Little Russia; Kherson,
Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Jessarabia excluding Sevastopol in
New Russia; the province of Kiev excluding the capital; and
2Simon Dubnow, History of. ihe. Jews in. Russia and Poland
(3 vols.; Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of
America, 1918) , I, 307.
3lfei&M P* 310.
the Baltic provinces (for old settlers only).
The "great reforms" of Alexander II produced new hope for
the Jews, Some Jews in fact were granted the right of unre-
stricted residence and the opportunity for government service.
For the most art, these Jews were educated at institutions of
higher learning and were a long way advanced toward assimila-
tion. For the masses of Jews in the Pale of Settlement, the
"tsar liberator" did very little. In 1880, when the reforming
zeal of Alexander II turned to reaction, the Jews were the
first to suffer.
One of the reasons for the renewed persecution of the Jews
was the rise of industrialization in Russia. Before the 1870's
and 1880's the Jewish people had been prevented from taking
part in the economy. Residential restrictions limited the
number of Jewish industrial workers. Even agricultural occu-
pations were denied the Jewish masses.* Rapid industrializa-
tion threatened to destroy the Pale as an increased demand for
workers and an op ortunity to make a living allowed many Jews
to afford an education for their children and provided capital
to establish their own industry and commerce.
The failure of the government to Russify the Jewish
masses—a virtual impossibility v/hen they were forced to live
in the Ghettos of western Hussia with no contacts with the
^Louis Greenberg, &* Jej*a j£ Russia. I, 11.
^Solomon M. Schwarz, TJje. Jews in. £fc& Soviet Union(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, I95EF, p. 8.
Russian people—and the fear that these alien and dangerous
people might be unleashed by industrialization, led to a severe
oppression and persecution, reinforced by new anti-Jewish leg-
islation. Efforts to Russify the Ghetto were abandoned and as
Schwartz writes: "It [Judaism] was left to suffocate in the
narrowness, darkness, and economic hopelessness of its ghetto
existence."
The Jewish intellectual responded to the atmosphere of
new hope, encouraged by the early reforms of Alexander II, by
supporting a secular movement known by the Hebrew name of
.
".-,>: -.-".. (enlightenment) « Baifcalaii if i t.c on the progrea
through which the Jew could attain emancipation. Based on the
principles of eighteenth-century French rationalism, the
Jewish intellectual saw in Haskalah the promise of a new era—
"A vision of deliverance from the intolerable conditions of
the ghetto. "7
Dissatisfied with the day-to-day existence in the shtetl .
the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, u the followers of
Haskalah, or maskilim as they were called, turned more and
more to the realm of the spirit as they sought their indentity
in the life of reason and enlightenment. The ideal of the
°Solomon M. Schwarz, Tjjg, Jews in. the. Soviet Union
,
p. 9.
?Louis Greenberg, Tjie. Jews, la -^tussia . I, 20.
o
°For an interesting account of the psychological effects
of life in the Shtetl, see: Ruth Landes and Mark Zborowskl,
"Hypotheses Concerning the Eastern European Jewish Family,"
Psychiatry
.
XIII {November, 1950), hh?-k&+.
"good life" was a long way from reality. The Jewish intellec-
tual thus became, in effect, cut off from the existing world.
The maakllim . however, did not participate to any great
degree in the Jewish revolutionary movement. Only in the
1870's, with an increase of Jewish graduates from the univer-
sities, was there a significant number of Jews engaged in rev-
olutionary activities. This group of young Jewish intellectuals
while inheriting the love for abstract principles and fine
webs of theory from their Haskalah predecessors were to go
fartrier than the maskilim. Where the mashillm saw in assimi-
lation the opportunity for achieving the "good life" for all
Jewry, most of these university students felt that Russifi-
cation would casue Jewry to disappear as a "race. The idea
that there val such a thing as a Jewish race was seen only as
a vestige of their isolation in the ghetto. Where the
HfflftKliLHimi urged religious reform ("Be a Jew in your tent, and a
man in the street,") to help eliminate the spiritual separa-
tism of the Jews, the younger generation opposed religion en-
tirely.9
Yuri Osipovich Martov was a second generation product of
these rebellious university students. In order to understand
the Jewish influence on his revolutionary career it is neces-
sary to explore the "Jewishness" of the whole Russian Jewish
revolutionary movement. Gould there even be a Jewish movement
^Simon Dubnow, Hi3torv of the Jews
T
II, P.Ch,
if those who participated in the Russian revolutionary movement
rejected their religion and sought to assimilate—to Russify
—
their whole existence? Another question that must be answered
is to what extent the contribution of these revolutionaries
was specifically Jewish in nature. To what extent was it i -
polled by motives that were of a Jewish nature as op osed to
motives that were common to the members of the distinctly
Russian movement? Was it, as Count Witte once said: "...The
fault of our government. The Jews are too oppressed?"10 Did
Martov have a personal sense of grievance because of the op-
pression of the Jewish people living in the Pale of Settle-
ment, and did this cause him to become a revolutionary?
Some answers will be suggested in this thesis which may
clarify the role Martov was to assume in the Russian Revo-
lutionary movement.
Since revolutionary movements are the creation of intel-
lectuals the e could have been no Jewish revolutionary move-
ment until the 1870's. At least there could have been little
question of the participation of Jews alongside the Russians
until there existed a Jewish Intelligentsia sufficiently as-
sinilated to understand Russia's problems in addition to their
own. Indeed the very term intelligentsia is a peculiarly
Russian term and not a Jewish torn. Because of the importance
^Gount Witte, Mgfflolrg 2L Ppunt Witte T trans. Abraham
xarmolinsky (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company, 19^1)
P. 380.
of the word Intelligentsia to this discussion, a working defi-
nition must be established.
The intelligentsia in nineteenth century Russia Ml a
"class" of intellectuals who embraced certain philosophic no-
tions which included a monistic view of nature, socialism, and
the conceit of revolution. This is a very narrow definition
'-, a necossar'.ly narrow definition if one is to discuss the
impact of the intelligentsia on the Russian revolution.
In Russia, the intelligentsia, both as an historical phe-
nomenon and a social concept, has been Intrinsically connected
with the process of westernization. The Russian intelligentsia
spoke of Westernization within the framework of the sets of
categories, concepts, and symbols used by the precursors of
the Slavophil-- ner conflict. Is Russia historically
oound to the West or does Russia 1 s past and future lie to the
t—to the "great Slavic peoples" and their Eastern outlook?
The Russian intelligentsia became intrinsically bound to
Westernization. Richard Pipes even contends that the intelli-
gentsia was a by-product of Westernization.11 At any rate,
the Russian intelligentsia adopted not only the broad aspects
of Western civilization—Its cultural heritage, its modes of
life, its history—as their own, but also adopted certain ide-
ological movements which were "rationalist" in character—spe-
cifically the French and German positivist thought. French
•^-Richard Pipes, Foreword to the issue "The Russian
Intelligentsia," Daedalus . (Sumner 19^0), p. **39.
8materialism was the vogue among the younger genera ion of the
intelligentsia during the l860 f s and 1870* s. Louis Greenberg
singles out Chernyshevsliy and Pisarev as the two most important
figures that influenced the Jewish Intelligentsia, this Rus-
sified non-religious group of Jewish intellectuals described
above.
The Russian intelligentsia tf s t« adopt this estranged
group of Jewish intellectuals. J In doing so the Russian
movement preserved its western outlook. This is a very ira-
tar.t point and one that most historians neglect to mention.
The Jews of course were not the only group within the intelli-
gentsia to stress the '—?stnrn aspects of the intelligentsia
tradition but after the turn of the century they were perhaps
the most important.
'thin the intelligentsia, oriented as it was to the West,
there developed two liscernible elements. On the one hand
the Karodnik tradition concentrating its energies upon Russian
12Louis Greenberg, Th£ Jews Ac. Russia f I. 123-12*+.
•^The Jewish intellectual was no more "estranged" than
the Russian intellectual. Martin Malia described this aliena-
tion in concrete terms when he wrote: "In a society th t
throughout the nineteenth century was over ninety per cent il-
literate, a gymnasium or a university education was in fact an
extraordinary thing, which set its recipients apart in an ex-
alted but also extremely isolated position. In the lS^-O's, in
any one year there were only 3, 000 university s indents in an
empire or some 50 million inhabitants; in the l86Cs there were
only }+,500, and in the 1870' s, just a little over 5,000, out of
a population of some 60 million. Quite literally then the in-
telligentsia was the embodied Intel] ;e of Russia." Martin
lia, "What is the Intelligentsia," Daedalus . LXXEC (Summer
^), p. ifW.
problems s. jally. On the thar hand was an internation-
alist tradition uh.Lch later centered around Marxism. It will
be argued that the Jewish intelligentsia represented the in-
ternati nalist tradition .rid were thus more v/esternized,
whereas the specifically Russian intelligentsia gravitated
2 toward the Harodnll: tradition—shall we say Slavophile
.diticn?
The development of this nascent nationalism in the Russian
intelligentsi .sly inevitable. Historically Russia
had evolved outside Vam Influence of Western :,urope. Russia
had experienced no Reformation, no renaissance, and no E: -
lightenment—until it vas imported late in the j ' nth cen-
tury. Russia's problems, teen from the eyes of the intelli-
gentsia, could only be solved by throwing off the )£
autocracy to allow Russia to catch up with the '.Jest. Since
Russia's past was 30 different, Western solutions did not al-
ways . There was no large middle class through which re-
form could be initiated. Ther 1 very little industrial-
isation to eneoura change in the social and legal order.
There remained only the peasant and the landowner.
The flarodnik tradition was essentially a Russian, and
'ore not >>etern tradition. It was Inspired by the be-
lief, promulgated by Herzen and later expanded by Chernyshevsky,
Dobroliubov, Lavrov, Mikhailovsky, Tkaehev, to name just a few,
t the peasant, through his tradition of revolt and his so-
cialist instinct, would sweep away the tyranny of the autoc-
racy and establish an era of freedom in Russia.
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There were Jews among the Populists. Jewish revolution. -
ies could be found in all the various groupings, classifica-
tions, parties, factions, what have you, in the revolutionary
movement. One of the founders of t erty part
was a Jew, For „rt, the Jewish intelligent;: id
not participate to any |3 in the Iv.arodnik movemci .
Leonard Sliapiro reports that statistics prepared by the Rus-
sian authorities during the 1870' s do not suggest that the
number of Jews among t. - rodniks waa disproportionate to t
Tk
total numoer of Jews in the country. Signii icantly enou
the re nc Jews among the leading ideologists of the move-
ment. This is underst-nd.. 1 ..hen one considers that the
: 1 X -i f despite his assimilation, could hardly be-
come I ied to a movement that was "rooted in the mystique
of Slav nationally.:. "16
Why did the Jew become a ...odnik? In all probability
the Jewish intelli .w in the goal jpulism—the estab-
lishment of a ftn siety—an opportunity for Jewish emanci-
pation as well.
The Jewish intelligent^;! did resent the autocracy for its
**l o, "The Sola of the Jews in the Russian
Revolutionary Movement," The Slavonic and East Huroy>ean Review
,
XL (December, 1961) , 151.
1
^Louis Greenberg, The Jews in llussia f II, 155.
xoLeonard Shapiro, "Uikhailovsky and the liystique of
Populism," Slavonic and oast European ;loview . XXXIV, (Daoaaber.
1955), 57.
II
op;, i -,g measure: against Russian Jewry a but he also s.
a revolution the chanoe to be the equal of the Russian. To
bring about this revolution, to . tee the •quality of the
Jew and the Russian, the Jewish Intel ntsia could not "wait
for assistance from above," as Martov was to say in I891*, they
had to work for it. The Jewish proletariat had to push
, ide their peculiar habits fostered by their life in the
jto. I'hcy had to a the Russian language. They had to
break away from their religion whic :late<i •;; act of
the ily existence—including dress and di ,.--..hich stood
iMifioatiacu
The >-. urxiss .. iS very strong among the Jewish
intelligentsia. 0: all the parties in the Russian revolution-
ary movement the .J^cial Democratic Party cc.
Jews. Lenin noted at the Second Congress of the Russian So-
cial Democratic Workers' -arty that one third of all the del-
. es were Jews, Besides Kartov there were two other Jews
in the top leaders , iksel'rod and Trotsky. While no sta-
tistics are available to this researcher as to the exact num-
ber of Jews in the Social Democratic Party at this time, it
was undoubtedly far out of proportion to the number of Jews in
Russia.
3-?M # Rafes, Ocherki ^o Istoriy?:. ida (Moscow*
Izdatel'stvo Sakholgami, 19^3), p. 26.
/ladimir Ilich Lenin, Socheneniva (55 Vols,, 5th ed;
1-ioscowt Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Literatury, i960),
Vol. 6, 1*89.
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Marxism of course was not a Russian doctrine but an inter-
nationalist doctrine. ^ it offered a solution to Russia's
problems that was based on the historical experience of Western
Europe. The Jew in Russia, even the intelligentsia Jew, could
more easily adjust to a cosmopolitan internationalist movement
than a strictly nationalist movement. It might be argued that
even Zionism was an internationalist persuasion. Marxism how-
ever had a special appeal to the Jew in the l880's when indus-
trialization spread through the Pale of Settlement.
The growth of industrialization in the Jewish Pale re-
sulted in more than the usual social problems. Before the
rise of the big cities and the growth of factories, the Jewish
working class consisted primarily of the small artisan or
craftsman and his employees . Since the Jews were not al-
lowed to pursue agricultural occupations, the labor force for
the new industries was supplied by reducing the bulk of the
Jewish craftsmen, employees, and other small employers to the
status of permanent proletarians.
By far the most severe effect of industrialization in the
^Bertram D. Wolfe casts some d ubt on the international-
ism of Marx and Engels by pointing out their interests in
German affairs above European, and thus international devel-
opments in the working class movement. To the Russian Marxist,
particularly Martov and other members of the Jewish intelli-
gentsia, the spirit of Marxism was internationalistic whether
Marx was or not. Bertram D. Wolfe, "Nationalism and Inter-
nationalism in Marx and Engels," American Slavic and East
European Review, XVII, (December, 19???, 19*^
Solomon Schv/arz, T|ie. Jews j£ th£ Soviet Union
f p, 8.
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Jewish Pale was that when a factory was forced to curtail pro-
duction or completely close down durinc slack periods of the
year, the economy of the Pale of Settlement was disrupted.
With virtually no small industry to absorb some of the unem-
ployed, many workers and their families faced starvation. The
May Rules of 188251 and the rigid enforcement of other anti-
Jewish legislation bound the Jewish worker even more to the
Pale. As a result, during the critical periods of unemploy-
ment no relief through migration was possible either. With an
22
oversupply of labor, exploitation was rife.
It is not surprising then that the Jewish intelligentsia
should embrace Marxism. The proletariat, whether he be
Russian or Jew, was oppressed. Revolution was the only an-
swer, but unlike Narodnik's scheme of revolution, the Marxist
revolution was to be led by the proletariat—the universal
working class.
It was this orientation that was responsible for Martov*s
revolutionary Weltanschauung.
Yuri Osipovich Martov (Tsederbaum) was born on November
21Called the "Temporary Rules," the May Rules of 1882
prevented Jewish settlers from living in the villiages and
hamlets of the Pale; Jews could not own or operate real es-
tate or farms outside of the cities, nor could they do busi-
ness on Sunday or other Christian holidays. These temporary
rules remained in effect until 1917. Louis Greenberg, The
Jgws ifi Russia, II, 30.
f2M, Rafes, Ocfterfcl £2 Igtorftya Bunda. p. h. Mr. Rafes
writes in his introduction to this collection of essays that
by I896 the average working day of a Jewish worker was be-
tween fourteen and sixteen, and sometimes even eighteen hours,
while the pay was as low as 2 or 3 rubles a week.
Ik
2*+, 1873 in Constantinople. Yuri's father worked for a Russian
commercial company and was employed part-time as a correspond-
ent in Turkey for the two leading journals in St. Petersburg,
the Petersburgskava Vedomosti and Hovoe Vremva. Martov'
s
grandfather, Alexander Tsederbaum, was deeply involved in
Jewish affairs as the founder and editor of the first Hebrew
newspaper ever published in Russia. 23 as Martov remarks in
his memoirs; "Journalism was in my blood."^ Yuri's mother, a
Viennese by birth, addressed the child only in French and oc-
casionally in New Greek. It was not until the family moved
back to Russia at the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of
1877-1878 that Martov learned to speak Russian.
As was increasingly common among the Russified Jewish in-
tellectual elite, the Tsederbaums were not religiously in-
clined. Martov recalls in his memoirs
s
I knew that we were not Catholic and not Orthodox.. .and
that instead of going to a Cathedral or a Polish Roman
Catholic church...we were supposed to attend a synogogue
to offer prayer. However, my parents and I never went
except on one state occasion—the time of Alexander II 1 s
funeral. But the sense of belonging to some particular
kind ofjion-Russian people such as the Jews was foreign
to me .2!?
23Yuri Osipovich Martov, Zapiski So^al Demoforafri
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Z. I. Grshebina, 1922) p. 9. Herein-
after cited as Martov, Zapiski . Simon Dubnow, a contemporary
of Martov described Alexander Tsederbaum 1 s Hebrew paper as
"colorless" but acknowledges the contribution Tsederbaum made
with the Jew's first newspaper. Simon Dubnow, History of the
Jews , II, 65.
2lf
Y. Martov, Zapiski, p. 1*+.
25Ibj£., 15.
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The death of Alexander II was met with great sorrow among
the Jews. The minor reforms granted by the Tsar had done
little to better conditions in the ghettos, but even a small
improvement of their economic and legal status elicited an
attitude of gratefulness on the part of the Jews. In the
living room of his home, Martov recalled the conversation of
his parents and their guests about the assassination and how
unfortunate this would be for the Jews.
Another event occurred during Martov's early years which
was to impress on his mind that he was a Jew and the object of
a seemingly unreal but terrifying persecution. This was the
Odessa pogrom of 1881. Martov writes:
The news that, as Jews, we were candidates for some
sort of pogrom and threatened with injury did not easily
find room in my consciousness. I don't remember whether
I asked my elders for the causes of tiv'.s event. Most
likely I did not, because in general. I asked very little
and attempted to think everything out^for myself until I
arrived at some satisfactory answer. 2b
Street by street the mob stormed the houses and shops of
the Jews, pillaging, destroying, killing. The servants begged
Martov's mother to allow them to hang ikons in the windows and
to paint crosses on the mirrors in hopes the house would be
passed. She refused • Before the mob reached the Tsederbaum
home the police arrived at the scene and the pogrom never hit
the house.
Martov never forgot this incident. He describes how months
latnr, when the family was on the way to St. Petersburg to
26Y. KMartov, Zflplskj, p. ?7.
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join their father, an old Jew on the train related the horrible
scence of a pogrom in Elizabe thgrad and he remembered his own
27
experience. Years later these same events were to £_ 3 his
consciousness with the fact that he was, "despite my Russian
ideas, manrr , and speech, a member of that oppressed minor-
ity—the Jew."28
In St, Petersburg, Martov was enrolled in one of the ten
gymnasiums of that city. Because of an unusually high enroll-
ment that year he was forced to enter a gymnasium that was
noted for its prejudice against the Jews. As Martov later
noted
:
We, the few Jewish students, were confronted on all
sides by a spontaneous view of ourselves as an "inferior"
race rather than with anti-Semitic hatred. The others,
sons of petty bourgeois Jews, carried this burden pas-
sively and attempted to survive unnoticed.
I. who had been brought up in a Russified and lib-
eral milieu, was incapable of surrendering without a
struggle. Acerbated by the whole order of school life,
my sensitiveness became a disease.
^
After several unpleasant incidents at school, Martov came to
realize that his struggle against irrational, brutal prejudice
was a losing battle. Jewishness became a weakness that he
would never be able to overcome.
These experiences tended to draw Martov into a shell.
His ..orId became a world of fantasy, a world divorced from
27Y. Martov, Zapiski
. p. 19.
28Ibid., p. 27.
^Ibid .. p. 26-27.
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reality. Martov turned to literature. In addition to the
books of Jules Vorne which he avidly read, Martov also read
various works by Turgenev, Lermontov, Schiller, Hugo, "ge
Sand, Dickens, Shakespeare, Tolstoi and Dostoyevsky.^ By
the time he w«- s fourteen, Martov was introduced to the lit-
erature of the revolutionary Intelligentsia. In his father's
library he read Alexander Herzen's memoirs and tales about the
Narodovolsti. He would listen as a circle of his father's
friends from the "democratic intelligentsia" zatt at their
house to discuss autocracy and political freedom.
During the reigh of Alexander III only a few Jews of high
social status were allowed to live in St. Petersburg. The
Tsederbaums apparently were legally entitled to reside there
because of the father's degree from a university. In I889
when the family attempted to return to St. Petersburg after a
years stay in Tsarakoe Selo, this right was temporarily re-
voked by the police. Once again Martov was reminded that oven
the life of a privileged Jew could be filled with anxieties
and fears of repression.
After several months of waiting, the Tsederbaums received
a reprieve and Yuri was allowed to enter a Petersburg gymna-
sium. Martov records his delight with his new surroundings.
30y. Martov, Zaolskl. p. 33.
^Ibid .. p. 31. The Karodovoltsi were members of the
Populist party Karodnaya Volya (Peoples Will) which broke
away from the Land and Liberty Party in 1879. In Russian
the word Volva means both Will and Freedom.
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Many of the students were from intelligentsia families. For
the first time in his life Mi rto? could not only associate
with youths who held the same idea3 and values as he, also
found that they welcomed him into their ranks. A bad knee
wh:'ch had presented him fron playing with his fellow students
before did not matter now. His new companions were not inter-
ested in childish -ancs."
Martov and his friends spent most of their time dis-
cussing how th*y could contribute to the rove '.u tiflttvtf move-
ment. The radical university students became their heroes, the
few illegal revolutionary pamphlets which they obtained became
their guide. Within this atmosphere, Martov' s revolutionary
ideas began to jell. He new began to make his plans for a
revolutionary career. Histories of the French Revolution, the
revolutions of 1830 and I8*f8 were discussed in terms of the
Russia of their day, Danton and Robespierre, 31anc and
Lamartine were seen as liberators of Jew and Russian,-"
The following spring Martov was introduced into the rev-
olutionary camp, A liberal writer by the name of Shel
;
unov
had died and, as Yuri suspected, a number of university stu-
dents and a few radical workers gathered to conduct a demon-
stration. Martov and several of his young comrades slipped
out of school to attend the ceremonies. As the procession
moved down the street to the cemetery several of the university
3%. Martov, 5»plgja» p. 35.
33Ibid .
T p. 1*8.
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students attempted to force the young boys to go home to their
"parents coat-tails" by remit ling them of the risks involved.
Rumors that government spies with photographic equipmo ., /ere
taking their pictures, and that recognition might mean they
would be prev nted from entering a university did not deter
Martov. In his memoirs Martov wrote how this first taste of
revolutionary activity becaiae indentified with the attainment
of adulthood. -^
At the University of St. Petersburg, whe.e he enrolled in
I89I, Martov was ready to begin what he considered to be a
real revolutionary career. Immediately he and several com-
rades organized a study circle where they discussed "every
book they could find that had even the vaguest reference to
socialism. "3? N. D, Sokolov, an older student already noted
for his revolutionary activities, took the group under his
guidance
.
While his friends studiously pored over the "weighty
scientific tomes" and concerned themselves with the "important
questions about the historical role of the proletariat In
Russia and the special features of the historical process in
Russia," Martov had more romantic ideas. He writes:
As an impassioned reciter of everything that
possible to get from the history of revolutions, I
found the ideal revolutionary in Robespierre and St.
Just—all of whose works I knew well. A simple but
3ky. Martov, ZajsIaU, P. &U
35lbi£., p. 61*.
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tisfactory result of this enthusiasm was a primitive
Blanguist conception of revolution as the triumph of
abstract principles of
.
opular power valid for all
times.... 36
This same romantic spirit can be found in his first lit-
erary effort, an introduction to an illegal publication. Quo-
tations from .lobespierre and Saint Just filled its pages. As
Martov was to admit later: M Ht] was completely deprived of
moderation and accuracy. nJ
Yuri's romanticism can be seen again in his expectation
of an immediate peasant revolt and in his proposal to create a
revolutionary organization which would direct the Petersburg
workers and soldiers in an uprising to coincide with the peas-
ants march on the capital.™ It can be seen in his reaction
to his first arrest and interrogation by the police:
Seeing myself in an old-fashioned coach, between
two of the most real gendarmes, I finally experienced,
so to say, an aesthetic satisfaction. One cannot be
eighteen and not feel a need for a romantic context
for the serious situations in life. 39
Taken out of context this remantic spirit—this expres-
sion of a genuine devotion to abstract ideals—does net appear
to be very significant. As Martov said, from an eighteen-
year-old, this is to be expected. The fact is, however, that
Martov retained this idealistic conception of the world. Even
36Y. Martov, Zapiski. p. 93-9*+.
37IMd., p. 95.
38Ibid .
T pp. 100-102.
39Ibid ., p. 109.
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though he would outgrow his youthful day dreams of a popular
uprising of the poor Russian peasant, or the persecuted Jew,
Martov would never adopt the hard oold roalism which was so
characteristic of his revolutionary companions, Leonard
Shapiro, commenting on the differences in personality between
Martov and Lenin, concluded:
...Where Lenin could subordinate everything to
this one end [the revolution 3, Martov could never
emancipate himself from his innate moral canon. Lenin
could veer, prevaricate, intrigue and sow confusion,
seeking support from the devil himself if offered....
Martov [was] a prisoner of standards of behaviour r<nd
of principles which he never thought of compromising. 1^
The peasant uprising predicted by Martov did occur.
It was not a revolt against the landowner nor the govern-
ment, but against those members of the intelligentsia who
had been sent to help the peasant .^l Disillusioned, Martov
turned to Marxism. Russia* s problems could not be solved
by "going to the people," but only by an emphasis placed
on the mission of the workers' party to fight for civil
and political frendom.
^Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (New York: Random House, 1959) > PP« 25-26.
^-The Narodnik policy of "going to the people" was not
always greeted tilth the kind of enthusiasm received by our
present Peace Corps. In the early I890 , s a cholera epidemic
was raging in Southeast Russia. The helpless peasants de-
cided that the Narodnik doctors and nurses who were inocu-
lating them were actually trying to infect them. Many of
these doctors and veterinarians were killed. Leopold H.
Haimson, The. Russian Marxists and the. Qrftgto pf_ Bolshevism
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955)*
p. 68.
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In addition to the gigantic Marxian classic, Das Kapital
T
Martov and his study circle read those works of Plekhanov and
Akselrod that were smuggled into Russia from abroad.
In spite of the severe crackdown on revolutionary activ-
ities during the reign of Alexander III, there were still many
social democratic circles in Russia—especially in the indus-
trial centers. The purpose of these groups, led oy the rev-
olutionary intelligentsia, was to prepare the workers intel-
lectually for tho coming political struggle. In addition to
the popular socialist literature that could be obtained with-
out too much difficulty, these circles generally studied such
subjects as history, geography, mathematics, and the natural
sciences. As one might suspect only a limited number of
workers were either capable or interested in this type of
activity.
The question arose in Martov* s group then, as to how
they might further the cause of social democracy. Rather than
limit their activities to the more advanced workers, Martov
had more ambitious plans:
We instinctively felt that circle propaganda alone
threatened to leave Marxism out of the main current of the
revolutionary movement and that it should be supplemented
by some sort of work designed to spread our ideas more
widely among the working class and to exercise political
influence over a democratic circles, which were in a
state of fermantation.
^^Y. Martov, Zaplskl
T p. 121.
^Louis Greenberg, The. Jews Jg Russia T II, 131.
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We came to the conclusion that to simply offer our
services as propagandists to a Petersburg Social Der-
ocratic group—which had appeared, even to us, as the
most natural thing to do—would be unreasonable. In-
stead of this came the idea of providing propaganda
ourselves by the publication of a series of pamphlets
and thereby. • .aiding in the establishment of ties
between Petersburg and other cities in which there
were labor circles, on the one hand—and on the other,
influencing circles of young students, and in general
those milieus in which the battle between Marxism and
the Karodnichestvo was raging. We hoped thereby to
strengthen the cadres of Social Democracy. ^*"
A few months after the Petersburg group began its oper-
ations, Martov was forced to return to prison to sTve the
remainder of the sentence for his previous offense. Six
difficult months passed before he was released. Even then
his release stipulated that for two years he was to remain in
exile from St. Petersburg and other university cities. Martov
decided to spend those two years (1893-1895) at Vilno to work
with the Jewish labor organizations already founded in this
highly industrialized city.
M+Y. Martov, ^aj&sJsi, p. IhQ.
CHAPTER II
OB AGITATSIA, THE *WT»! EXPFRIEKCE
Martov's experience at Vilno was to have a long lasting,
if not permanent, effect on his revolutionary career. By
working with the Jewish proletariat in their struggle against
the intolerable conditio s of life in the Pale of Settlement,
Martov was not only reminded of his Jewish background but was
to adopt a characteristically Jewish response to the demands
of reality. Within the framework of the "consciousness" and
"spontaneity" categories, Martov was to express this Jewish
experience. It. became the basis for his program for social
democracy.
Shortly after Martov arrived at Vilno he became engaged
In the activities of the local social democratic organization.
Most of his new associates were from assimilated intelligentsia
families. Consequently in the propaganda of these Vilno
circles the e was nothing that distinguished the Jewish cir-
i
cles from the non-Jewish circles. Specifically Jewish prob-
lems were not discussed and the language of the propaganda was
Russian. Martov's view of the role of tne Jew in emancipation
can be seen in the following address presented in Vilno:
1Louis Greenberg, The Jews in Russia . II. IV3. Leonard
Shapiro points out that it ir s by accident rather than design
that the Jewish intelligentsia worked among the Jewish workers
instead of the Russian workers. This would be true in the
case of Martov, who, had he not been exiled, probably never
would hav^ gone to Vilno. Leonard Shapiro, "The Role of the
Jews," p. 156.
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We dare not sit with folded hinds and wait for assistance
from above. We shall be saved and emancipated only
through our own efforts. As far as possible each should
seek to educate himself and ethers and thus contribute
toward the formation of at least small socialist groups,
for the time being. Through these circles we shall be
able to become members of the great universal struggling
workers' party which acting in unison will achieve its
human rights. Then shall b^ inaugurated genuine freedo ,
fraternity, and equality for all mankind, Jews not
excluded.*
Although Martov's ideas were later to become altered in some
respects, the crux of this discussion of the Jewish influence
on Martov's revolutionary world view is his belief that eman-
cipation must come about through identification with, if not
participation in, the emancipation of the "universal strug-
gling workers," in other words, through a revol; I ion.
Yuri was invited to head a study circle of garment
workers by the local Vilno organization. Before long he be-
came one of the leading figures in the Jewish labor movement.
In the preceeding year, 1892, a series of strikes had
broken out involving the Jewish workers in Vilno. The results
were, in most cases, favorable to the workers. The Vilno
social democrats, however, had done very little in promoting
or leading this "spontaneous" strike wave. Martov's analysis
of these strikes resulted in some very important changes in
the tactics of the social democrats. Rather than concentrate
on passing as many workers as possible through the study
2m. Rafes, Ocherkl m Jstprjya Bu^a., p. 26.
3y. Tlartov, ^asigki Social Demokrata. p. 22h. See also
^^'gtoya Sovotskaya SntsMopecUya , ?nd ed., VIII, col. 97.
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circles, he urged that agitation be carried out among the mass
of workers. This agitation emphasized the very thing that had
caused the I892 strikes—dissatisfaction with the immediate
economic problems of the wo;ke.s. In his memoirs Martov
writes
:
We decided that the center of our activity should be
transferred to the sphere of agitation and that all prop-
aganda and organizational work should be subordinated to
this basic task. By this was implied agitation on the
basis of the day-to-day economic needs of the laboring
masses which brought the proletariat into conflict with
its employers. There was no talk of agitation on the
basis of other social interests ...or on the basis of
cultural questions, because /e instinctively followed
the path of least psychological resistance. We took
the averape worker as he was at that time, limited to
a local and shop view, falling to bridge the gap
separating this view from the social life of other
classes*
But we were convinced that once they were drawn
into a social struggle on the basis of these day-to-
day economic interests, the masses would be prepared
by the very process of this struggle to assimilate
wider social and political strivings and thus put into
contact with other classes, brought to self-definition
in relation to them. Therefore, we didn't doubt in the
least that oy this new path we would arrive at the
formation of a social democratic labor movement. 1*
Martov's ideas were not greeted with much enthusiasm
among the young workers aire dy in the circles. For these
workers the educational program of the study group was their
only op ortunity for Intellectual development. "The thought,"
wrote Martov, "that the circle would now consist primarily of
agitators and that the subject matter taken up by th^ir cir-
cles would be calculated to prepare the students for activity
among the masses was entirely unacceptable to the greater part
**Y, Martov, SapAskj SotgJAl Demokrata t pp. 225-226.
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of the working youth."?
Martov 1 s supporters, on the other hand, sensed the oppor-
tunity offered by the mass economic struggle of the workers
and decided to change the tactics of the organization so as
to adapt them to the new situation.
On May 1, 1895 Martov delivered an address, later pub-
lished as a pamphlet under the title: "A Turning Point in the
Jewish Labor Movement", which was to become an important
document in Russian-Jewish socialist literature. :!artov ! s
argument was that the success of socialism was due to the in-
troduction of democratic and economic elements into the move-
ment. He went on to point out that the hope c: socialism in
the future would rest on the solution it provides for the
needs of the masses, and that the economic strugnle of the
worker would naturally lead him to battle eventually for
political freedom.
Most important, Martov 1 s May Day speech urged the or-
ganization of a special Jewish workingmans* party. This
was the first time in a public speech that a social democrat
made any distinction between the needs of the Jewish worker
7
and the Russian worker. Martov also suggested that the
language spoken and written by the propagandist be changed
?Y. Martov, Zauiskl Sotsial Demokrata . p. 227.
^Yuri Osipovich Martov, Povorotnvi Punkt y. Istorii
L| -.0 tafej i\, .r-?:..-i ' l5 (C-~~-7 .:""""!:• ../-I'ntvo kind*.
Wi P. 3.
?Louis Greenberg, TJ^e. Jews ia Russia T II, lk6.
28
from Russian to Yiddish—the only language understood by the
masses of Jewish workers.
Many statements in this speech appear to be contradictory
to his previously stated position that Jewish emancipation
could only take place by indentification with the Russian
proletariat. For example: "The Jewish proletariat should
not depend on the Russian or Polish working class for its
liberation, but in compliance with the democratic slogan
'through the efforts of the people themselves, 1 work for their
redemption as Jews. "9 in Martov's view, the indifference of
the Jewish masses to the "fate of their nation" was a handicap
to their development of a class consciousness. "If a people
are not willing to battle for its proper status as a nation,"
he said, "neither would it attempt to rise from its inferior
class status.... National consciousness must go hand in hand
with the awakening of class consciousness."10
The apparent contradiction lies in his definition of
national consciousness and outright nationalism—which he
%. Martov, Povorotnyl Purikt y. Istorii . p. 10
9X&L&.> P« 9.
1 Ibid .
T p. 10, iMartov then advocated a specifically
Jewish Party on the grounds that if at any time in the
future the Russian proletariat were forced to sacrifice some
of its party demands, it would most likely be "demands
which exclusively concern the Jews, such as freedom of
religion or equality of civil rights for Jews."
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detested. As Martov concluded 3 ipeeehl "We can boldly
stress the specific Jewish character of our movement without
running the risk of turning aside from the universal workers'
movement in general and the Russian in particular. m11
Martov' s May Day speech is generally considered to be
one of the documents which laid the foundation for the General
Jewish Workingmen's Party of Russia, Poland, and Lithuania
—
1?
the Bund as it came to be called.
Strikes conducted by Jewish workers and the development
of special strike funds helped create a strong Jewish labor
movemert. ^ In 1897 socialist leaders throughout the Pale
of Settlement felt that the time was ripe for unification
of the various Jewish social democratic organizations into a
single party. At a conference held at Vilno the Bund was
founded
.
By virtue of the fact that the Jewish socialists had
emphasized mass agitation, thus Incorporating a wide network
of workers and organizations, the Bund became a mass pa ty.
For example* in 190k-5 the Bund's membership reached 1*0,000
1;L
y. Martov, Povorotnyi, Pfflfct % Istorll, p. 10.
12
"The Bund" The. Universal Jewish TfroycJLopedla (Hew
York, 19*+8), II, 587. See also M. Safes, Ocherki no Istoriva,
Bjjnjia., p. 30.
13Ibid . The Strikes wore held in Vilno and Bialstok
in 1891 ; Vilno, 1692; Warsaw 1893; Bialstok, Minsh, and
Vilno, 1895.
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while the Russian party committees numbered only 8,ifOO.
The Bund, although it was a Jewish organization, always
regarded itself as part of the Social Democratic Party. The
executive committee of the Bund gave essential aid to the
organization of the First Party Congress of the Russian
Social Democratic Party in I898 and became a constituent
member of that party though it demanded autonomy in strictly
Jewish matters. -*
The Bundists engaged in the economic struggle but also
maintained political aims. In 1900, at the Third Convention
of the Bund, an extensive campaign against the government,
featured by public demonstrations, was planned. The govern-
ment reacted by arresting and deporting many of the leaders,
but the Bund was still the only Jewish organization actively
engaged in revolutionary activities.
Martov sup orted the Bundist movement during his prison
term and immediately after his return to St. Petersburg in
.OD
^"The Bund," TJjg. Universal Jgwigft Encyclopedia. II,
588. cf . Bol'shaya Sovotskaya Bntsiklopediva. VIII, col. 98;
XI, col. 531. The Jol ' shava gives the figures for the same
period as 23>000 members in the Bund and 8,^00 in the «ntire
Russian party.
^Leopold H. Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the
Origins of Bolshevism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University iress, 1955), p. 72. Martov alludes to this in
his memoirs by saying that the demand for autonomy in Jewish
affairs was a natural development that followed from the
climate of opinion over his May Day speech: V mae 1895 goda
ehta ideya lish 1 brodila v vozdukhe v nashikh krugakh* Y.
Martov, Zaptokj Sotsial Demokrata T p. 2»+5.
1 Louis Greenberg, The. Jews in, .tassia
T p. ll+5.
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1900 S-f In 1901, however, the Bundist movement reached a
turning point. At the Fourth Convention in Bialstok, the
Bund expressed itself on the question of Jewish Nationalism,
The convention pronounced itself in favor of a Russian state
based on a federation of nationalities in which the Jews
would become a constituent part. Martov opposed the dec-
laration of the Bundist convention claiming that the whole
•jo
idea was "bourgeois." 3ut the ass inflationist policy of
the majority of Jewish intellectuals was overridden by the
non-intelligentsia section of the Bund.
The democratic basis of the Jewish labor movement was
one of the features that Martov had always admired. Yet
it would seem that it was this feature which brought about
the collapse of the Jewish Bund after the Revolution of
1905. The Bundist intelligentsia, out-maneuvered and out-
voted in subsequent c nventions, began to drift away from
the Bund. The majority of its leadership as well as its mem-
bership after 1905 was composed of laborers. 20 This was re-
flected in the inc easingly Jewish program of the Bund which
began to use Yiddish exclusively at their conventions. The
resolutions adopted were all on internal Jewish matters: the
recognition of Yiddish as the national language of the Jews,
17Y. Martov, Za£isi£i Sotsial Demo3;rata T p. 2»*9.
l8
Ibid.
T p. 250.
^Ante, p. 07,
°"The Bund," Th£ Universal Jewish Encyclopedia
T II, 599.
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a demand for the employment of Yiddish in Jewish schools and
institutions, and an insistance to observe the Jewish Sabbath
?1
instead of resting on Sunday," By isolating themselves from
the intelligentsia and the theoretical and organizational
framework of the Russian movement, the Bund was ineffective.
After 1917, threatened with repression by the Bolsheviks, the
Bund ceased to exist.
The principal difference in the development of the Jewish
social democratic movement and the Russian movement after
189^ was the success the Jews had in passing from propaganda
to agitation. Plekhanov had differentiated between these two
terms when he wrote: "The propagandist presents many ideas
to one individual, or to several individuals. The agitator
presents one idea only, or a few ideas, but he presents them
to a whole mass of persons...." By emphasizing the
"spontaneous" economic struggle the Jewish agitators had
succeeded while the Russian propagandists often were isolated
from the workers.
Martov was undoubtedly influenced by this success, and
though he later stressed the need for party supervision of
the workers' spontaneous outbursts, he consistently leaned
toward the Jewish ap. roach.
These two op osite revolutionary tactics—agitation to
21
"The Bund," The. Universal Jewish BicygJ.onedl.a,, II, 599.
!2Leonard Shapiro, The. Communist Party
,
p. 23
.
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produce a spontaneous revolt on the art of the worker to
better his economic conditions, and propaganda to educate
the worker to a class consciousness that would lead hiia to
political opposition—produced much of the debate among the
revolutionary intelligentsia in Russia until the revolution
of 1905. Those who sup orted the concept of agitation were
confident that the proletariat would grow into conscious
social democrats because of their experience in the economic
struggle. Those who favored the propaganda idea argued that
the workers would never become social democrats, that they
may be successful from time to time In bettering their
working conditions, but they would forever remain an oppressed
class in a bourgeois state. Instead, argued the propa-
gandist, the social democratic party must lead a class con-
scious proletariat in a revolution against absoluti:
Martov* s answer to this conflict may be expressed as a
synthesis of both approaches. In his first actual publica-
tion, a historical foreword to a speech by Jules Guesde, Yuri
presented a dialectical interpretation of the evolution of
2k
Russian revolutionary thought. In his memoirs, Martov
9%
"-This interpretation of the necessity of the propagandist
approach was fostered by Plekhanov and Lenin and was very
popular among the "politiki." For an explicit statement of
this position see V. Lenin, "What is to be Done," Selected
Works (15 vols.; New Yorks International Publishers 7 19 I+3) t
Trp?9.
2Tfe.rtov's first literary endeavor (ante, p. 20) was not
published because his comrades objected to its demagogical
character. Y. Martov, Zapiski Sotsial Demokrata . p. 2?.
3V
outlined his earlier attempt to combine the revolutionary-
energy of the proletariat with the consciousness process.
The Narodnichestvo of the 1870*3, Martov contended, was the
thesis of this dialectical pattern. That movement had been
based on the idea of a popular uprising leading to a social
revolution. The Narodnaya Volya represented the antithesis.
Its program was to bring about a political revolution without
the aid of the masses. This revolution would be achieved
through the efforts of a "critically thinking" intelligentsia.
The resulting synthesis was social democracy, which aimed at a
social revolution through a "conscious working class." '
What Martov meant by a "conscious working class" became
evident in a pamphlet entitled Ob Agitatsia (On Agitation).
Martov collaborated with Arkady Kremer, a leading Jewish
social democrat in Vilno, on an analysis of the successful
experience of the Jewish workers in th« economic struggle.
Kremer, who was later to b^ one of the founders of the Jewish
Bund, outlined this analysis in Ob Agitatsia while Martov
edited and supplied a preface to the pamphlet.
Until l89*f the Marxists in Russia had confined their
activity to the formation of circles that were hardly distin-
guishnble from their Populist predecessors. ~ After t
2?Y, Martov, Zapiski Sotsial Demokrata, p. 158. It was
with this publication that Yuri assumed the name Martov.
26Henry J. Tobias, "The Bund and Lenin until 1903," The
Russian Review. XX (October I96I)
, 3^5.
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Martov-Kremer essay was smuggled into St. Petersburg and other
parts of the empire, the whole character of the revolutionary-
movement was to change. The social democrates began to shift
to agitation.
Ikrtov and Kremer argued that the primary concern of the
masses wa3 to obtain political power. But, they said: "The
masses of people are drawn into battle not by theoretic
arguments but by the concrete logic of things, by the natural
course of events which forces them in the struggle." 2 ' The
daily economic struggle had taught the worker (the Jewish
woivker) the need for political power, for he saw how an
unsympathetic government could block his plans for economic
improvement through the use of anti-la ;or legislation and
police brutality. Agitation then, was to be based on the
daily needs of the proletariat and lead, from specific griev-
ances to mass strikes, and from mass strikes to the organ-
ization of a vast labor organization which would be strong
enough to carry out a successful revolution against the
28
autocracy.
The need for a social democratic party to assist in the
development of a proletarian class consciousness and provide
leadership in the political struggle was established as a
necessity in Ob. Aeitatsia . out the ultimate goal of
Izdatel
28
'Arkady Kremer, Ob Agitatsia T ed. Y. Martov ( Geneva I
'stvo Bunda, 1898), p. 2.
bid ., p. 8.
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emancipation was to be achieved through the spontaneous up-
rising of the people. This is seen in the conclusion of the
pamphlet
:
The struggle incited by this agitation will teach
the workers to defend their interests; it will raise
their fortitude; it will give them a confidence in
their forces, a consciousness of the indispensability
of unity and confront them in the end with the more
important questions which require resolution. Pre-
pared in this way for a more serious struggle, the
working class will proceed to the solution of its
basic problems. ?-?
2k Agitatsia can be viewed as the originator of the
"stages theory;" the proletariat will turn to political action
when the "economic struggle will have made clear to it [the
proletariat] the impossibility of obtaining any improvement
in the existing political conditions. "3° It was this "stages
theory" which the Economists advanced to justify their tactics.
The Economist controversy provides an interesting ap-
proach in the examination of Martov's views of the revolu-
tionary movement from 1895 to 1903, If "spontaneity"—the
Jewish experience—was so important in Martov's scheme why
did he oppose the Economists whose program was based on the
very principles sketched in Ob Anitatsia? To answer this
important question it is necessary to explore the Economist
movement.
In the spring of I89? iiartov was allowed to return to
^Arkady Kremer, Ob Aeitatsia. p. 21.
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Iki2L., P. 13.
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St. Petersburg. Fresh from his experience at Vilno he urged
the creation of a now social democratic organization. Martov
proposed:
the creation of a labor organization founded on
agitational circles each of which was to constitute
the gathering place for the best spontaneous
fermentations at various points of the labor world
and the center of agitational activity on them.
By making use of various causes for dissatis-
faction, the organization was to formulate and
motivate the presentation of demands in every
clash between the masses and the employers, and
as far as possible, it was to present to the
masses proposals of struggle for this or that
economic or legal improvement, even before the
masses expressed strong dissatisfaction. 31
Along the lines that Martov had suggested, a new all-
Petersburg organization was formed: the Petersburg Union
for the Emancipation of Labor (Soyuz Borby za Osvobozhuenie
Truda)
.
Lenin was frankly skeptical that th^ workers would
naturally grow into political consciousness. Martov re-
calls that he was "cold, if not contemptuous" to the pro-
posed Union. "Lenin's background of underground activity,"
Martov rationalized, "mado him secretive not only towards
the police but towards tho working class also."-
Martov f s program for the Petersburg Union, which in
effect exposed the leaders to the dangers of open agitation,
3%. Martov, Zaniski Sotsial Demokrata T p. 263.
3?Ibid . T p. 26*t.
33ibld .
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probably helped him understand Lenin's secretiveness. In
December I896, during the first industry-wide strike, the
":... .•
- tad Littli tarca bit ' - 2.. t- ri 1 feba bttditf or Um
group, Lenin and Martov, along with the remaining leaders,
were arrested, sent to prison, and later exiled to Siberia.
Martov was sent to Turukhansk and was not released until
the winter of 1900.
3lf
During the absence of Lenin and Martov, the Petersburg
group was run by the younger social democrats who had so
enthusiastically endorsed Martov ! s draft of tactics. Early
in I897 another strike in the textile industry successfully
reduced the working hours to eleven-and-a-half per day."
The response of the workers to agitation on the basis o_
concrete, intelligible demands seemed to be proof that the
policies in Ob Agitatsia were sound.
Like the Jewish movement in Vilno the Petersburg Union
was rapidly developing into a mass movement. The Union was
also becoming more democratic as the rank and file party
members had acquired a special prominence with the new
3**Mertov had a difficult time at Turukhansk. He was
not only isolated from the developments in the revolutionary
movement except for a few reports that filtered through, but
also suffered a mental strain that caused two nervous break-
downs in that Siberian episode. Y. Martov, Zapiski Sotsial
Demokrata
T p. 371-376.
3?A law was passed in June, I897 fixing the working
day for adults at eleven-and-a-half hour3. L, Gre=nberg,
The Jews in Russia
T p. I*f8.
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emphasis on agitation,
A new labor journal, Raboohaya Mvsl T was formed to give
voice to the growing preoccupation with the economic struggle.
flabochava Mral . although some of its members were from the
intelligentsia, was dominated by the factory agitators and
propagandists, Haimson, in his analysis of the Economist
controversy, emphasized the trend away from tha political
struggle that followed the success of the strikes. He cites
the manifesto of the journal to demonstrate this point:
The economic struggle, the struggle against
capital on the grounds of day-to-day b sic interests,
strikes as the instruments of this struggle—this
is the motto of the labor movement ••••Let the workers
conduct this struggle » knowing that they are fighting
not for some future generation but for themselves and
their children; let them understand that «ach victory,
every inch seized from the enemy, is one more step
climbed on the stairway leading to their own welfare;
let the existing forces call the weak to the struggle
and place them in their own ranks, without counting
on any external aid. Victory is ahead but the upper
hand will be held by the fighters only if their motto
is: 'the workers for the workers,'3o
It follows from this statement of policy that if social demo-
cracy had become the expression of the working class in the
economic struggle, its leadership should be composed of the
workers
•
While Ilartov had not objected to democracy in the Jewish
organizations and had even praised it, he tended to side with
Lenin against the proposed change in the organizational
structure of the Petersburg Union, As he wrote in his
^"Leopold Haimson, Tfcg. Russian Marxists , p. 79.
ko
memoirs j
Insofar as the day-to-day practice of the Union
had previously consisted of the leadership of the
workers' professional struggle, the proposed organ-
ization would cramp these leading ranks in all
attempts to widen the scope of their revolutionary
work and to take it out of the wrapping of the purely
trade-union struggle.... [Since ] we considered the
concentration of the strength of the party on the
latter as Just a strategic scheme, leading by the
surest path to a direct struggle against absolutism,
we greeted the project with skepticism and supported
Ulyanov.37
Martov's support of Lenin on this issue was not to be
important until 1900. Meanwhile the two leaders could do
nothing but wait and watch from their Siberian outposts as
the Economist movement gathered momentum.
While in St. Petersburg and other cities the social
democratic organizations we e following the "path of least
resistance," Plekhanov and Aksel'rod in Geneva were preparing
for the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic
Workers' Party. According to these great theoreticians of
Russian Marxism, the new all-Russian party was to be founded
on the Marxist idea that the workers should cooperate with
the more advanced liberal bourgeoisie and peasants to bring
30
about the downfall of the autocracy. Their program, in
other words, was based on the primacy or olitical demands
over economic demands.
37Y. Martov, Zasiski Sotsial Demokrata
T p; . 31^-317.
38Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a. Revolution (Boston:
Beacon Press, 19W, p. 93.
kl
Almost immediately Plekhanov and Aksel'rod we~e confronted
with the demands of the younger revolutionaries who favored
the economic struggle. It was obvious to Plekhanov, however,
that the economic struggle could not lead to the overthrow
of absolutism. 39 Even though, as Martov had hoped, the
experience of the workers in the economic struggle had led
toward a rise in the class consciousness of th« proletariat
in St. Petersburg, and had even led to conflicts with the
government which had sided with the employers during the
strikes, Plekhanov remained unconvinced that the workers
could, without the aid of the other advanced parties of Russia,
*f0
successfully overthrow the government.
This conflict abroad resulted in the formation of a
splinter party called the Union of Russian Social Democrats.
Its leaders, V. Akimov, J. Krichevski, and A. Martynov be-
came know as Economists. Around their n«w journal, Rabochee
Delo developed the center of the Economist movement.
For the most part, the Economists represented the extreme
of the position that the workers should concentrate on
improving their economic conditions. It should be noted
that this "extremist position," as Lenin called it, was
not held ay everyone in the Economist camp. The more moderate
Economists based their tactics on Ob. Aeitatsia . but even the
39aertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Involution , p. 93-
*+°Ibid .. p. 9*+.
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most radical members of the group did net deny the need for a
hi
political stru gle.
Martov, still in Turukhansk, was not aware of the seri-
ousness of the growing conflict in the party between the
Economists and the Politiki (advocators of the political
struggle). It was not until I899 when several reports were
smug-led into Turukhansk that Martov realized the danger of
the dispute.
1
*2 Among these papers was a pamphlet entitled:
Credo . The Credo was one of the most radical statements made
by the Economists. E, D. Kuskova, author of this anti-
orthodox manifesto, advocated a revision of the Marxist po-
litical program drawn up by the Social Democratic Party
hierarchy. The Credo declared:
We hope that intolerant, negating, and primitive Marxism
which unduly stresses and exaggerates the class character
of society will become more democratic in its conception
and will radically revise its attitude toward society as
a whole. ...The Social Democratic party should emerge from
its narrow sectarian interests and dedicate itself to re-
forming contemporary^ society along democratic lines and
to the defense of all working classes. ^"3
The Credo went on to say that while "political excluslvism"
was justified in Western Europe where all classes had achieved
a class consciousness, it could not work in Russia, "There only
participation in the life advanced by Russian reality, however
un-Marxian it might be, [would] shake the Russian citizen out
^Leopold Haimson, Thjj. Russian Marxists . p. 87
^-Y. Martov, Zar.iski Sotslal Pomokrata . p. 389.
!+3ihe Text of the "Credo" is quoted in full in: V.
Lenin, Socheneniva . IV, 153-156.
of his ] olitical lethargy."^
The suggestion in the Credo that the party be dissolved
or at least reconstructed with less emphasis on a disciplined
control by the arty organization deeply disturbed Martov and
brought his condemnation of the "inroads of Economism" in the
party.^5
At -his point we ee Martov as a theoretical proginator of
the Economist position through his program in Ob Agitatsia
T
but denouncing the Economists for their democratic ideas.
While in Siberia and again after his return to St. Petersburg,
Martov defended the idea of a stron • central party organiza-
tion. Yet at the Second Party Congress in 1903 he precipi-
tated the art;- split by demanding a democratic oasis for the
party.
One way to explain these apparent contradictions is to
say that Martov was a divided man
—that he was inconsistent,
vacillating, or even confused. Up to a point, this answer
would be correct. Both Haimson and Shapiro, eminent histori-
ans of the Russian Marxist movement, tend to accept this con-
clusion. There is, however, another point to consider:
^V. Lenin, Socheneniva
T IV, 155.
^Y. Martov, 3a?Asto Sots^4 Uemokrata . p. 393.
^Haimson writes: "His CMartov's] feelings bent him to-
ward a preference toward the uncontrolled growth of the Social
Democratic movement, but his disciplined will hardened in his
contact with adverse reality." L. Haimson, The toMilB
2&ESlSi&, P. 7*f. Shapiro calls it "ironic" thTt Martov sup-ported one view in 189? and mother in 1902 and concluded
that ifertov "suffered from some of the indecision which isborn of intellectual integrity." L. Shapiro, The Cou unist
irfiftj.) P. ^o.
Mf
What Jewish influence, if any, can be attributed to Martov's
stand?
The program of Ob Agitatsia was a synthesis of sponta-
neity and consciousness. On the basis of the experience of
the Jews, Martov concluded that the party would have to provide
the leadership in the political struggle. Even though the
Economists themselves agreed with these provisions, in reality
the Rabochee Delo-ists were moving away from the party. The
psychological effect of the spontaneous economic struggle,
against the government, amounted to a conviction that the
workers could gain concessions only by being strong—that is,
by succeeding in more strikes. A strong party therefore, was
not necessary. The Economists were, as a result of this ex-
perience, very close to the Marxian revisionists who advo-
cated an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary program.
Fundamental to Jewish emancipation, in Martov's view, us well
as in the views of the vast majority of the Jewish intelli-
1+7
gentsia, was the concept of revolution. '
The Credo was clearly a revisionist document. It should
be noted that the "democracy" it advocated went beyond the
demand for democracy within the Social Democratic Party.'
"Credo democracy" meant the participation of the parties of
the proletariat with all advanced liberal parties in an all-
Russian liberal organization. Plekhanov and Aksel'rod did
^Ante, p. 10.
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not oppose this idea as long as the Social Democratic party
acted as the leader. Martov, however, was violently opposed
to any organization where the bourgeoisie intermingled in the
affairs of the working class movement. Consider this state-
ment written in 1901
i
The struggle between the "critics" and "orthodox"
Marxists is really the first chapter of a struggle for
politioal hegemony between the proletariat and bourgeois
democracy. In the uprising of the bourgeois intelli-
gentsia again--. t proletarian hegemony, we see, hidden
under an ideological mask, the class struggle of the
advanced section of bourgeois society against the
revolutionary proletariat,...
The Economists are attempting to turn the
proletariat into an instrument of the bourgeoisie,
3y restricting it to the immediate economic struggle,
they are preventing it from developing its own po-
lito.c-1 program, from becoming an independent po-
litical force, and consequently from entering into
conflicts with the liberals. 1*8
This is a very stron indictment. Taking into consideration
the emphasis Martov placed in his memoirs on his study of the
history of revolutions
—
particularly the French Revolution,
and the Revolutions of I830 and 181+8—Martov 's fear of the
bourgeoisie becomes more clear. Each of these revoluti ns
resulted in a triumph of the bourgeoisie over the demands of
their co-revolutionists, the European proletariat. The Jew,
therefore, would never be emancipated in a bourgeois state.
At Vilno Martov had repeatedly accused the government of
lg agents of the bourgeoisie. ° The "universal struggling
1+8
^Yuri Osipovich Martov, "Vsegda v Men' shinstve.
Sovrem^nnykh Zadachakh Russkoi Sotsialisticheskoi
Intelligentsia," Zarva f no. 2-3 (Decer.ber 1901) , 190-191.
*h, Martov, aaniski Sotsial Deaokrata . up. ?23, °28, 1&H
Wworker.-;," which included the Jev/ish proletariat, could o: ly
be emancipated through their own revolution,
Martov's response to the Economist-Revisionist movement
would have seemed irrational in I895. During the 1900's how-
ever, Russian had witnessed the political awakening of the
liberal bourgeoisie. In I899, 1900, and 1901 university-
students all over Russia went on strikes and held demonstra-
tions.^ In Moscow, Kharkov, St. Petersburg, and Kazan
bourgeois elements joined the demonstrations, demanding po-
litical freedom for all society.-*1 Liberal bourgeois members
of the zemstvo organizations were beginning to express similar
demand?. -^ While Martov was apprehensive about a bourgeois
hegemony on the activities of the proletariat, P. 3, Struve
campaigned for an increase in the activities of the bour-
geoisie. A former Marxist, Struve now became one of the
strongest opponents of social democracy during this critical
CO
period. J The publication of the Credo , with its demands for
J Michael Florinsky, Russia , a. History and an
Interpretation . (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Jo-ipany, 1958),
II. 1165-1166.
?1
IM1.> P • 1166-1167.
^2Ibid .. pp. 1167-1168.
^Arthur P. Mendel, PUfifWg 3L Process, ia Tsarist
• iussia (Cambridge j Harvard University Press, I96I)
, p. 166.
Struve eagerly adopted the program of the German Socialist
Eduard Bernstein. In his Presses jo£ 999taU8B £&& S&a Tasks
of Joo:L..l Jeruocr.' ey
t
Bernstein dismissed the Marxian arguments
of Surplus Value, the Jlass Struggle, the Iron Law of Wages,
and in general the spirit of revolution. Bernstein's argument
was that society was gradually moving toward socialism, that
h7
a re-examination of the party's attitudes toward other classes
in Russia, attracted Struve to the Economists. He had long
insisted that the re-organization of Russian life was more
important than class interests, Russia, according to Struve,
could only be transformed by the "creative elements of Russian
i
-•
.
society."- T
Struve thus became the link between the Economists and
the Revisionists. It was this association, more than any
other single factor, that brought Martov into such violent
opposition to the Economist movement,
Martov was not alone in his argument that the evolu-
tionary theories of tb« Revisionists could not liberate
Russia from the autocracy. As the Revisionist-Economist
attacks on Marxian orthodoxy continued, the opposition led
by Lenin, Martov, Plekhanov, and Aksel'rod tended to solid-
ify, Martov came to embrace Lenin's solution that a strong
party leadership was necessary to combat the danger at hand.
this was a healthy movement, and that the Marxists were
therefore out of touch with reality. They were basing their
program on a mid-nineteenth century idea that no longer
corresponded to the actual course of events, Struve then be-
came the loader of the "critics" who attempted to reform the
misdirected "orthodox," The Economists, particularly the
extremists, hoped to reform the "orthodox" as well. Kuskova
and Krichevsky, by oi->posing the foundations of social democ-
racy in their rejection of an independent and exclusive work-
ers party and in their attempts to place the economic strup;le
in an evolutionary framework, made the clash between the
Economist-Revisionist disciples and the orthodox inevitable.
^"Arthur Mendel, Dilemmas of Progress
,, p, 173
•
*f8
The differences in viewpoints between Lenin ^nd Martov
—
differences that ultimately resulted in the Bolshevik-
Menshevik split—were not as yet clearly drawn. Martov did
not ask what Lenin meant when he talked about a "strong"
leadership, Martov did not then evaluate the Economist
oharga thc:t Lenin's plans for social democracy rested on an
"exclusivism" of tlr ty leadership. The primary task of
the orthodox Marxists was to restore party unity, to bring
the erra... Economists back into line. It was on this prin-
ciple that Iskra was born.
CHAPTER III
ISKRA AND 3
Historians have given considerable attention to the news-
paper Iskra and its attempt to restore party unity by creating
a strong nationwide party organization. In this discussion,
the Iskra period, I900-I903, will be examined in an effort to
arrive at some conclusions concerning the basis for the split
that was to occur at the Second Party Congress in 1903. This
thesis will argue that despite the semblance of unity there
were certain important differences between Martov's revo-
lutionary world view and the views of his colleagues. It
will attempt to show that Martov was pursuing a course that
was consistent with the general aims of the Jewish revolu-
tionary movement.
The idea of establishing a political newspaper to unite
the cadres of social democracy probably occurred to Lenin
long before he began making preparations in I899 during his
exile to Siberia. Martov had received several letters from
Lenin with vague references to the establishment of an all-
Russian social democratic organ, but until 1900, after his
return from Turukhansk, Martov knew only that some sort of
'ournalistic enterprise was being planned in which he, Lenin,
Potresov, Plhekhanoy, and Aksel'rod were to take part. 2
^•Elizabeth Hill and Doris Munie (eds.), Letters of Lenin
(London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1937), P. 105-10?.
^Y. Martov, Zapisk.X Sotsial Demokrata
t p. *kL2.
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During the early months of Iskra's existence Martov had
every reason to believe that he and Lenin had interpreted
the history of the revolutionary movement in much the same
way. Consider Lenin's essay in the first i3sue of Iskra t
"Urgent Tas'is of our Movement:"
In our opinion, three circumstances have prepared
the ground for this sad state of affairs [the growth
of the Economist-Revisionist movement]. First, in the
beginning of their activity, Russian 3ocial Democrats
restricted themselves merely to work in propaganda
circles. When we took up the work of agitation among
the masses we were not always able to restrain our-
selves from going to the other extreme. Secondly,...
we oft-n had to fight for our right of existence against
the Karodovolists, who by "politics" understood activity
isolated from the labour movement and who reduced pol-
itics exclusively to struggle by means of conspir-
acies....Thirdly, in working isolatedly, in small,
local workers 1 circles, the Social Democrats did not
devote sufficient attention to organizing a revo-
lutionary party. ...3
Martov could agree with Lenin that propaganda circles alone
were not the answer. I-iartov's Jewish experience had shown
the need for a mass movement. On the second point again
there was agreement. The Karodovolists (liarodovoltsi )
.
Martov had written earlier,^ had erred in trying to bring
about a political revolution through "critically minded
people" without the aid of the masses. In Oo A itutsia
Martov 's argument on the need for a revolutionary party was
•^Vladimir Lenin, "Urgent Tasks of Our Movement," Selected
Works . II, 10.
^"Ante, p. ?'.
?Ante, p. 3^«
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similar to Lenin '3 third point. And vhat objections --Juld
Martov have with the concluding quotation of Lenin's article:
"The muscular arms of millions of workers will bo raised, and
the yoke of despotism, that is guarded by soldiers* bayonets,
will be smashed to atoms?"6
This first issue of Iskra appeared in December 1900,
Plekhanov, Aksel'rod, and Vera Zasulich of the Emancipation
of Labor group, and Lenin, Martov, and Potresov representing
the Social Democrats in Russia made up the editorial board.
Significantly enough, there were no Economists on the
board. In 1900, Lenin, Martov, and Potresov had met with
the "kritiki" to discuss the possibilities of representing
all factions of the party in Iskra
T
but primarily because of
7
Martov 1 s objections, no basis for agreement was reached.'
o
At this "Pskov meeting" Struve and another "legal Marxist,"
Tugan-Baranovsky
,
joined forces with delegates of the
Economist Union of Social Democrats Abroad to present offers
of collaboration and sup, ort of the new organ. Martov was
extremely skeptical. Struve, in Martov 1 s opinion, was an
agent of the bourceoisie, who, if the opportunity ever arose,
Vladimir Lenin, "Urgent Tasks of Our Movement," ;>olocted
Works
T
II, 10.
7
Yuri Osipovich Martov, "Pskov." Leninskii Sbornik (23
vols.; Moscow: Gospolitizad., 1?23), IV, 51.
o
The term "legal Marxism" was derived from the idea of
reforming Russia through "legal" channels such as the Zemst
.
Other than th t the e was nothing legal about it for many
legal Marxists participated in underground activities.
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would conclude a deal with the autocracy at the expense of the
people.' In an account published in 1921, Martov had this to
say of the Pskov meeting!
.•The representative of the Soynz [Union of Social
Democrats Abroad ] asserted that the Soynz did n~t
s^and for Revisionism, for the denial of political
ta~ ", or for the organizational fragmentation of
the party, and they attributed the split with
Osvobozhenie Truda [Lenin and Martov 1 s Petersburg
groun] to the authoritarian tendencies of Plekhanov
and Aksel'rod....
I attributed this step of the Soyuz to political
chicanery, resulting from the change in the general
awakening of public opinion expressed by the student
strikes, which indicated that the political Isolation
of the workers on th« arena of active struggle would
soon cease.... 10
In the same article Martov expressed his distrust of Stru ->:
Lenin and Potreseov agreed to carry on our
discussions with Struve and his colleagues on the
basis of a clear formulation of our own credo in
reference to both the struggle against tsarism and
the theoretical struggle against Revisionism and
reformism.
. • . I expressed my doubts as to the
possibility of an agreement with the kritiki., 1
we were not to abandon our open and irrevocable
struggle for orthodoxy.... I predicted that [in the
case an agreement was reached] the agreement would
be broken tram the very beginning.-
As long as Iskra battled against Economism—against the
khovostists
T as Lenin called them12—Martov gave his full
support to the program. He became one of the most prolific
^Yuri Osipovich Martov, "Politicheskii Razvrat i
Ekonomicheskoe Tupoumie," Leninskii SbornJ,k, T IV, 13.
10Y. Martov, "Pskov," Leninskii Sboraik
T IV, 55.
11ibj,d., 59-60.
"•^The Russian vord "khovost" means tail in Russian.
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writers in the pages of Iskra . denouncing the critics of
social democracy and urging all loyal Marxists to follow the
guidance of Iskra to victory over absolutism.
It is important, however, to note the nature of Martov's
attacks. F. I. Dan, Martov' s brother-in-law and a revo-
lutionary of some stature himself, remarked in his political
testament that Martov was primarily concerned with the
question of Marxian orthodoxy. Dan frankly admitted that
Ob Aeitatsia had provided the theoretical foundation for the
development of Economism and that Martov did not object to
the emphasis the Economists placed on the economic struggle
,
except when used as the "exclusive agent in the struggle
of the workinr- class for emancipation."1^ While Dan's tes-
tament was not published until 19k6 there seems to be little
doubt that his interpret;,! ion was correct.
The evidence suggests that Martov saw in Economism a
threat to the oltlaat* emancipation of the worker, and thus
to the Jew.
The "guidance" Iskra furnished appeared in the form
of answers to problems in Marxian theory, as well as, of
answers to problems that confronted the revolutionaries in
their day-to-day struggle. Articles explaining, or rather
"exposing," the halfhearted liberal op os ition, the petty-
bourgeois nature of the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the
13Feodor I. Dan, Protafchogndenle Dol'shevizm k Istorii
fflBjWgfttltiWgKjlffll 1 Wgffid^^atfrtogfakh. idoj. y. floss11
Posle. Osvooozhdeniva Krestvan fltew York; Kovaya Demokratlya,
19**6), p. 2¥:--2>+5.
9*
international "op ortunists" (the Revisionists) were consistant
with Martov's view of the role the proletariat should play in
the revolutionary movement.
Under Lenin's leadership, however, Iskra also became a
militant organizational center for social democracy. At
first iiartov was not aware of the implications of Lenin's
organizational plans. The immediate task of establishing
a centralized, all-russian Social Democratic Party precluded
the existence of a loose organization resting on the "free
and unhampered develo pa nt" of thr> workirv class, to quote
one of Martov's pet phrases. Yet he did not object.
There were two very real reasons for Yuri's acquies-
cence. In June 1902 Struve published the first issue of a
journal, Qsvobozhdenie . which was recognized immediately as
a menace to social democracy. In 1902 "police socialism,"
the Zubatovshchina . made its appearance at St. Petersburg.
Qsvobozhdenie , according to Struve 's plan, was to act
as a center for the new liberal movement. It emphasized
the reorganization of the state through the zemstva and
city assemblies, otruve hoped to build liberal sup: ort
for his democratization of all Russian society. An edito-
rial in the first issue of Qsvobozhdenie demonstrates this
new platform*
It would be desirable to leave to existing
organs of self-government the right to select
deputies not only from. ..the ranks of the zemstvo
and city electors, but also from the whole of
Russian society. Such a course is preferable to
the jump into the unknown that all attempts at
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ad hoc elections would constitute, "since they
would have to cope with ] inevitable governmental
pressures and unpredictable sta on of mind among
social classes unaccustomed to political life. 1^"
Martov, commenting on the publication of Qsvobozhdenie
.
was even more adamant in his disapprobation of Strove'
s
"conspir. ^r « H
The constitutionalists [ Martov wrote 3 are
attemptlag to organize the liberal bourgeoisie,
not so much to struggle for the overthrow of
absolutism, as to prepare for a ttruggls for the
right to rule undividedly over Russia after the
victory of the people over absolutism. ...The aim
of Qsvobozhdenie is to bring forward the opinion
it is organizing with a demand for a constitution
at the moment, vrhen the government, under the
threat of the revolutionary movement, will flni lly
recognize the need for reform, 15
If Martov was disturbed by (kvobozhdenle . he was furious
over the successes of the Zubatovshchina . V. S. Zubatov was
the chief of the Moscow Okhrana. From the time of his
appointment in 1899 until he was dismissed by Pleve ir 1903
»
Zubatov attempted to bring trade unionism under the control
of the police.
cow was the scene of the first "police union. M As
Wolfe writes of the Moscow workers:
d that a paternal government was with
them, they rushed into the strange union. Five
days after it was formed, it was able to lead a
llfCited in L. Haimson, Th£ Russian Marxists t p. 152-153*
^Y. Martov, "Programma Russkikh Liberalov," Leninskii
SbprnitS, IV, 133-13 1*.
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procession of fifty thousand workers into the
Kremlin for solemn prayer before the.tomb of
the Emancipator Tsar, Alexander II. ie>
Soon the new unions were mushrooming all over Russia,
The Zubatovshchina was particularly successful amongst
the Jew?."*1 workers not yet controlled by the Bund, Zubatov's
argument that the only reason the police seamed to be against
the workers was that, in trying to obtain fairer working
conditions, the proletarians were being misdirected—they
were attacking the government, not the source of their
problems, the employers, Zubatov encouraged the Jewish
socialists to drop their anti-governmental protests and
concentrate on achieving their economic goals through closoly
17
supervised strikes. '
Many of these Jewish socialists, already under arrest
by the police, were won over by Zubatov's program and re-
leased. The leader of this group was a woman, Mania
Vilbushevich, Un^r her direction the Independent Jewish
Workers Party was formed. After several triumphant strikes,
thousands of Jews were drawn into the Independent Party,
For *M»t#T, the Zubatovshchina represented a heresy
that had to be destroyed. His view that the Jew could only
be emancipated by a revolution undoubtedly contributed to
^Bertram Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution p, 273-
^Louis Greenberg, The Jews in Russia t p. 178.
l8Ibid.
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his hostility and fear of this "police socialism."
Martcv's analysis of the phenomenal growth of the
Zubat ovshchina was diametrically opposed to Lenin's a alysis.
In his essay " Jne Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Lenin
cited the traitorous socialists in the Independent Jewish
Party as an example of what hap ens when the party cadres
are not carefully selected. Only such a picked va >*uard
could successfully lead the masses of uneducated workers under
the conditions of "endless fragmentation, oppression, and
mental torpor." ° Martov felt that this was an incorrect
assumption. To him the Zubatovshchina ' s growth had been
due largely to the party's failure to open its doors wide
to the leadership that the working class "had Itself created"
and to make room for the individual initiative of these
20leaders.
Martov was following the line of "free process of
ideological struggle" that was characteristic of the in-
terests of the Jewish intelligentsia. In 1903, 'Martov would
show that he had those interests in mil I.
In May of 1902, Martov encouraged the Bund to take any
action that m:ight be necessary to stop the spread of the
21
Zubat ovshchina menace. While the 3und had been virtually
^Vladimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Hazad,"
SoofteniAiVft) VII, ?39.
?0Ibid . T p. 2*f0.
21M. Rafes, Ocfrerkj £0. Iskoriva 3unda T p. 109.
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helpless in areas outside of their control, the attempt to
establish an Independent Jewish Party in Ode ;sa, a strong
Bundist center, led to the downfall of Zubatov and police
socialism in Southern Russia. With the approval of the
; olice a series of strikes, which thanks to the Social
Democrats so n ;ot out of hand, were conducted by the
Independents. The strikes, which had begun as ecoi omic
protests, ended in a political protest that resulted in a
stoppage of industry, net only in Odessa, but all over
Southern Russia. Zubatov was dismissed, tr ders of
the Independent Jewish Party arrested, and the 3undists
22
were once again the only Jewish workers' part in llussia.
The triumph of the Bund was a triumph for Iskra as
well. As Shapiro writes: "It Is easy to soe what valuable
ammunition it provided for Iskra in its fight against
Econcmism. Iskra could argue that for the workers to con-
fine themselves to economic demands was to play into the
hands of the police." -J
No discernible conflicts amon,^ th members of the Iskra
editorial board appeared until late 1902. There were visible
signs that many Social Democrats w-re bning "re-converted"
to the "true" Marxist position of Jfikj^. and that the ex-
tremists in the Economst movement were becoming isolated
2?3ertram Wolfe, Three Wh£ Made §. Revolution , p. 375,
and L. Greemberg, J£hjL Jews jyi auasla , p. 179*
^Leonard Shapiro, TJjg. Communist Party p£ £r£. Soviet
Union , p. *+2.
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fro i their former adherents. This, Martov could appreciate.
Several la t problems, on the other hand, remained
to be solved. What organizational tactics must be employed
to maintain a c-ntr lized party? What role should the party
apparatus assume in the party? In 1902 Lenin proceeded to
define these problems in his essay Chto Delat*
.
In Cbto Delat * there is a statement of the priiciples
upon which Lenin wished to base the whole social democratic
movement. This essiy is not only important for this dis-
cussion, but for an understanding of the organizational
principles upon which the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union uould be based.
When the pamphlet firs appeared, Martov voiced no
objectioi . If Lenin is to be believed, Martov lauded the
publication of Chto Delat 1 as a "main link" in the under-
standing of the necessity for a centralized party. Martov
was probably referring to the first two chapters of Chto
Delat 1 which were devoted to upholding the revolutionary
theory of Marx in opposition to the 3e: nsteinian Revisionists
and their followers in Russia.
In attacking the kritlki . Lenin introduced his idea
that the party raur:t be the vanguard of the working class,
that the party cadres must "oe professional revolutionaries
who would devote their entire lives to the cause of the
party and the working class, and that these professionals
Vladimir Lenin, "What is to b<=> done," aoi*»+.aH Wnrfrs
,
II, 51n.
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must be armed with a revolutionary theory to train the workers
to understand scientific socialism.
Arguing vithin the framework of the old f imiliar catego-
ries, "spontaneity" and "consciousness," Lenin admitted
s ontaneity was a natural development. The Economists, he
said, takine advantage of this natural development when they
agit.-ted among the workers to improve their immediate economic
status. But spontaneity did nothing to bring about a prole-
tarian class consciousness. In fact, argued Lenin, it led
to the repudiation of the need for a proletarian party; the
denial of a proletarian party led the Economists to deny the
need for an independent proletarian theory and tactics. This
was the reason, he concluded, that the Economists embraced a
deomccratic policy—a policy that called for a union with all
?6
the liberal groups in Russia."
Logically, Lenin 1 s analysis was full of holes . As an
interpretation of what had actually happened in Russia, it
must have been convincing to many Social Democrats.
The solution Lenin offered was that the Social Democrats
must have a revolutionary theory. Without this specifically
proletarian theory, the workinc class would be subordinated
to bourgeois ideology and oourgeols :olitlcs.~'
2
^Vladimir Lenin, "What is to be done," Selected Works .
II, k8.
26Ibid . t pp. 60-65.
27
I£L&., P. 170.
'1
The assumption that an all-Russian liberal union would
lead to a bourgeois domination of the working class, wa of
course, one of Martov's strongest beliefs. Ob Agitatsia
contained a similar interpretation of the effects of isolating
spontaneity from consciousness.
The differences between Chto Delat ' and Ob, Agaitatsia
are perhaps more important. Martov's interpretation of the
his: ^y of the struggle for emancipation included the belief
that by virtue of the workers' experience in the spontaneous
economic stru gle, they would develop a class consciousness.
i
Dan pointed out that Martov's formula "created the impression
that the working class would 'ripen' to a capacity to absorb
political agitation,"™ By meeting head on with the re-
actionary government the workers would realize that to solve
their problems the government would have to be overthrown
in a revolution. Lenin clearly had no such faith in the
worker. As he stated in Chto Delat ': "The theorectical
doctrine social democracy arose quite independently of the
spontaneous growth of the labor movement..,and it could only
be brought in from without."-* Lenin's statement "from
without" meant outside of the working class. The professional
revolutionary intelligentsia, armed with Marx's theory of
28A. Kremer, Ob. Agitatsia . p. 18.
^Feodor Dan, Proiskhozhdenie -3ol'shevizma T p. ?M+.
3°Vladimir Lenin, "What is to be Done," Selected Works .
II, 181.
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revolution, could be the only vehicle through which the workers,
in the first stages of development at leart, could understand
scientific socialism.^1 The intelligentsia would act as
"revolutionary bacilli" apreading the doctrine of Marx to
the worker, creating out of the working class a firm cadre
of worker intellectuals. The proletariat, in other words,
could not develop a socialist consciousness on their own.
They Of*Q4 not "train themselves."-^ The party, then, was
to be the agent through which these devoted revolutionaries
worked. The party had to det<=»rmi:e the best tactics to use
in order to further the interests of the proletariat on the
basis of a Marxian analysis of what these interests were.
For Martov, only those tactics which would guide the
worker to his own self-consciousness should be employed by
the Soci il Democratic Party. The role of the intelligentsia
would be to interpret for the worker, if necessary, his
experience in the economic struggle, but nothing more. 33
Lenin felt that the party should guide the worker to a revo-
lution not to a class consciousness. Only those workers
specially trained by the intelligentsia could "appreciate
their class interests and the historic tasks of the prole-
tariat. "3^
31yiadimir Lenin, "What is to be Done," Selected Works,
II, 182,
33Arkady Kremer, 0J> Agitatsia t p. 20.
3l
*Lenin, p. 189.
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The arguments in Chto Delat ' were to be presented again
at the Second Party Congress.
Iskra was now in a favora osition in the party.
Since the majority of the local organizations seemed to be
on their side, Lenin began making preparations for the
Congress. As early as March, 190? an Organizational Com ittee
representing all of the maj'or factions of the party had been
established for convening the party congress. These factions
then b~gan to draw up their respective programs and speeches
to be presented. The Iskra-ists had agreed on a program
but the question of what rules to adopt for the control of
the party 1 s organization hud yet to be decided.
Lenin was clear in his demand that the rules of the
organization should allow the establishment of a tightly
controlled centralized party. Because of the increasing
vigilance of the Okhrana, the revolutionaries, under Lenin's
plan, were to be controlled from two main centers: A Central
Organ, or 06, located in Europe and responsible for the
publications of the party; and a Central Com: ittee, or CC,
to which wa entrusted the immediate supervision of revo-
lutionary activities. The CO was to act as the ideological
base for the i arty--the real core of professional theore-
ticians—and to maintain agreement between the two groups
the method of cooptation was to be employed. Cooptation,
the selection of representatives to each others organization,
was Lenin's guarantee that the members would act in "complete
9*
solidarity and unity of purpose. "35 Under both committees a
series of subcommittees was to be a pointed. These sub-
committees in turn directed agitation and propaganda in their
immediate locale. They \iere the " r' ion centers" doing what
they were told to do.
Before the Congress o; -ned in Brussels, Lenin showed
Martov the proposed draft. He may have shown it to the
©the members of the Iskra editorial board, but Martov 1 s
comments were the only ones Lenin recorded. 3° Martov, though
he objected to the proposed draft, was indirect in his
criticism and suggested a rephrasing of two major ambiguous
parts: Who was to be included as a party i >, and what
exactly was to be the relationship between the CC and the
CO? It was these two points which would ultimately bring
about the clash between Martov and Lenin.
Martov* s formula for the new party was not very different
from the ideas he expressed at Vilno. He emphasized the
value of an all inclusive party membership, democratically
organized, and emphasized the practical immediate needs of
the revolutionaries in their day-to-day struggle. B; sug-
gesting a rephrasing of Lenin* s definition of party member-
ship, Martov pointed to the fact that the proposed draft
made no mention of where in the pyramidal structure of commit-
tees and subcomittees the line .;ould be drawn between party
3% idimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Nazad,"
.frOQheneniva
T VII, p. 313.
, , ,_
,Wfi* In the English edition Martov' s comments weredeleted.
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member and sympathizer. Would only the intelligentsia hold
this i itle or would the factory agitators be included too?
Lenin's formulation on this point stated: "Everyone is con-
sidered a member of the party who accepts the party program
and who supports the party by material means as well as by
persoral participation in one of the party ore. .nizat ions. "37
Martov's suggested revision still did not answer the question,
but i suggested at least that the membership would be more
inclusive than Lenin's. It read: "Everyone is considered to
belong to the HSDHP who accepts its program and works to ca ry
out its tasks in life, under the control and leadership of the
party org: ns."3°
On the question of the CC and CO, Martov was disturbed
over the fact that the proposed draft did not distinguish
clearly the activities to be carried on by the two centers
and what authority each would have over issues that could have
theoretical as well as practical implications—in other words,
over any isn ^. Lenin's formula was vague though it tended
to -nhance the ideological leadership of the CO.3? Martov's
3'Vladimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Nazad,"
goflrePCPiTfrt VII, p. ?27.
3^ Ibid .
39mihe editor of Lenin's Socheneniya remarks that Lenin's
first draft statement on the respective roles of the CC and CO
had ~n lost. From Martov's comments about this draft and
Lenin's subsequent discussions about it, it is possible to de-
duce the nature of the original. Vladimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered,
Dva Shaga tiazad," Socheneniya
t VII, 228. For Martov's com-
ments see following footnote.
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rephrasing of this rule again did net reveal a decided dif-
ference in the respective positions of the two leaders. Yet
Martov' s changes attempted to restore the balance between
the CC and CO. It read: "On the CO lies the general lead-
ership of all the practical activity of the party, on the
literary organs lies the ideological leadership of party
life, of propagande for the party program, and of scientific
and journalistic development of the world view of Social
Democracy . "^°
The crux of the debate over the party rules can be
seen as a disagreement over the total view of the ; arty and
its role in the revolutionary movement. Should it be based
on the principles found in Onto Delat » or should it be bas^d
on the Jewish experience outlined in Ob Agitata ia? Martov
had reason to believe that Lenin wanted ti e CO, the theo-
retical headquarters of the party, eventually to control
the entire movement and make the CC, in effect, a subcommittee.
In the provision for mutual cooptation of committee members,
Martov saw how this would be accomplished. The CC, exposed as
it was to police arrest, needed to replace its own members,
and not wait for a joint meeting of the CC and the CO for this
purpose. The result, Martov argued, "would be the domination
of the CO in a few months time." 1*1 In thls statement, Martov
**°Yuri Osipovich itertoy, "Pis'ma P. B. Aksel»roda i Y. 0.
Martwa," Aflsbiy. Ruggfrpj aevolvutsii (18 vols.; Berlin: 3. T.
Tesson 1
, 19?2) , I, 10.
^IfcUL., p. 12.
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actually came out in op os ition to Lenin's views, and even
then he agreed to compromise: "During the interval between
party congresses," Martov asserted, "cooptat'on in the CC and
the CO should be cm another basis than mutual cooptation.
Each college shoulu coopt its own members. The other college
should oe entitled to protest; then the matter would go to
the Soviet [a council composed of representatives of the two
centers]. 1^*2
The Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic
Workers' Party finally opened on July 30, 1903 in Brussels.
The Tares ordnung (agenda) had been drawn up by Lenin several
weeks before. Martov had suggested a few changes but had
given his assent. 3 Unknowingly Martov may have sealed his
fate at the Congress with his approval of the agenda. Lenin
had very cleverly placed a3 the first order of the day the
discussion on federalism. Confident that the proposal would
be rejected, Lenin hoped that the 3und, the largest Social
Democratic organization in Russia, would walk out on the
Congress and leave Iskra to fight only the Economist Rabochee
Delo group for control.
The Bund, it will be recalled, had voted in their Fourth
U-2
^Vladimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Nazad,"
5oQhenfiniva
r
VII
T 228.
'
^Vladimir Lenin, "An Account of the Second Congress of
the R.S.D.L.P.," Selected Works . II, 3V2.
^IMi., p. 3^2.
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Congress in April 1901 and again in 1903 at their Fifth Con-
gress to construct the Social D?: -nocratic Party on a feder-
ative basis in order that they might be the sole represent-
ative of the Jewish proletariat* That Lenin should op- ose
federation is understandable. For Martov, however, feder-
alism was much nearer to his view of what the party structure
should be. Martov had even submitted a resolution at the
Congress to permit regional autonomy for the Caucasus and
national cultural autonomy for the nations composing: the
Caucasus* In a speech before the Congress he justified his
stand by saying: "The vast extent of Ilus.-ia and the expe-
rience of our centralized administration point to the ne-
cessity and expediency of regional self-government for such
large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania, and the Caucasus."^
From this idea of regional self-governmen follows the idea
of regional autonomy. Thus the Jewish concentration in
Poland and Lithuania were to be granted a form of self-
determination under Martov' 3 plan.
The reason Martov opposed t e Bund was probably because
the Jewish organization would not comply to the Iskra demand
for a centralized party, Henry J, Tobias in his analys |
of the relationship between the Bund and Lenin has this to
^Ante, p. 30.
U-6™Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the Rational Question
(New York: International PublisTiersPste)
, P. £3.
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say about Martov' s criticism of Bundist separatism:
Martov... criticized the Burl for its efforts to
squeeze the Jewish workers into narrow nationalist
channels when the ch'^f evil afflicting them was a
government policy which retarded thoir rapprochement
with the surrounding population. He pointedly
contrasted the Bund's behaviour with that of the
Jewish workers in the :outh who worked hand in hand
with their Russian colleagues for the general
demands of the | roletariat.^7
While Martov had declared his op osition to the "nationalistic"
trend followed by the Bund at their Congresses, in all
fairness to the Bund, it would be a mistake to ^ay that
nationalism in 1903 was very strong. Martov must have re-
alized this. The Bund ists believed, as did Martov, that a
broadly based party would best achieve the aims of social
democracy. Just as Martov had argued in 189?, the Bund
maintained that a broadly based party could not come about
unless the special needs of the Jewish workers were taken
k8
into acco nt~the use of the Yiddish language for example.
The Bund was a democratically based party with a mixture
of intellectuals and orkers at the leadership level. Martov
in his memoirs had praised this quality and added that, in
his interpretation of Marxism, a democratic structure for
the party was imperative. ° Martov's action then seem.'
1+7^'Henry Tobias, "The Bund and Lenin," Th£ Russian ;teviow .
p. 3^.
^Ante, p. 9B4
1+9Ante, p. Vfi
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unrealistic and contradictory unless one takes into account
the fact that the Bund represent«d a competitor to Iskra *
s
formation of a unified party* Unfortunately, once Martov
took a stand on an issue he would not easily alter his
position. At any rate, the Bund, un'il it did alk out
during the th:"rty seventh session of the Second Congress,
50
voted with Martov on every important issue.
The first clash between Martov and Lenin was over a
seemingly small matter, but like other seemingly insig-
nificant differences that were finally to draw these two
revolutionaries apart, this matter too may be seen in a
broader perspective. In a private session of the Iskra
caucus the question of selecting a presidium for the con-
vention was raised. The purpose of this presidium was to
settle disputes by negotiation instead of taking up time in
c?l
the general session. J Martov proposed that the presidium
be composed of nine men including a representative from the
Bund and Habocbee Delo . Lenin's proposal provided for only
three members, all of them Iskraists, who would "rule with
a firm hand, if necessary xdLth an iron fist."-* Martov*
s
!?0viadimir Lenin, "An Account of the Second Congress,"
Selected Works . II, p. 352.
5lThe presidium was similar to our Congressional Ways
and Means Conrcltteo.
52Lenin, II, p. 35V.
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formula was consistent with his democratic leanings. Lenin
had his way as Plekhanov was selected as chairman, Lenin
and Krasikov as vice-chairman—all Iskraists.
As the Congress moved on toward the last item on the
Tagesordnung
T
voting on the party rules, Martov and Lenin
braced for a showdown. Paragraph one of the rules was the
definition of a member, Martov and Lenin presented rival
drafts. The definition Lenin proposed was as folio
nA member of the RSDLP is one who recognizes its program
and supports the yarty materially as well as by 1 \L
PARTICIPATION IN ONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS OF TIT PARTY. "^3
Martov wished only to change the capitalized phrase to read J
w3y regular personal assistance under the direction of one
of the party organizations."^4
"
Needless to say the delegates were confused over the
excited Insistence that the two drafts were very different.
Lenin took to the floor and explained his formulation:
Martov 's formula ignores ore of the chief
evils in party life, the fact that under existing
conditions, it is difficult if not Impossible to
distinguish in the party between babblers and
actual workers. Nowhere is this confusion more
prevalent or more harmful than it is in Russia.
Yet Martov^ formula legalizes this evil; it
strives to make each and every one a party
member.... In order to preserve the firmness and
^viadimir Lenin, Selected Works . Editors Explanatory
Note, p. 34-9.
^Ibid.
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maintain the purity of our arty, we must
strive to raise the title and the significance
of party membership higher and highor. For
this reason, I stand op osed to Martov 's
formula. 55
Martov countered that he was for a centralized party
too but would have no part in an organization whos^ members
"abdicated their right to think." Martov expalined: "The
more widely the title of "arty member is extended, the
better. We can only rejoice if eve y striker, if every
demonstrator, proclains himself a party member when he
answers for his de^ds. wy In another speech Martov concluded:
In our eyes, the labor party is not limited
to an organization of professional revolutionaries.
It consists of them plus the ^ntir^ combination
of the active, leading elements of the proletariat...
Our formula alone expresses the striving that
between the organization of professional revolu-
tionaries and the masses exist a whole series of
organizations . 57
The debate went on for two whole sessions. Aksel'rod
and Trotsky (interestingly enough both were Jews) joined
Martov in his fight. At last a final roll call was ordered.
Martov ;on the point 28 to 22.5° «jhe Dundists and Rabochee
55yiadimir Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,"
Selected Works. II, hi?,.
?6Vladimir Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Nazad,"
Socheneniva
f
VII, 238. Martov' s statements are only in the
Russian edition.
?7Ibld . T p. 25*f.
5°Vladimir Lenin, "An Account of the Second Congress,"
Selected works . II, 350.
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Deloist had cast all seven of their combined votes for Mart .
Iskra had split.
From this point on, the "Iskraists of the sig-zag line"
as Lenin called Martov's group, held separate sessions from
the "firm Iskraists," Lenin's group. The 24artovites proposed
a separate list of candidates for the Central Committee
but all nine were defeated. On paragraph ten, the selection
of members to the Central Organ, Lenin, Plekhanov, and
Hartov were elected. -lartov refused to serve. ule twelve,
the question of cooptation, was the only other important
rule to be decided. Once again I-Iartov compiled a 28 to 22
60
win over Lenin and his group.
After the general rules had been adopted, the Congress
turned its attention to the rules of the j^und. 3y an over-
whelming majority the Congress again rejected the proposal
of the iiund for federation. The -3undists then left the
Congress and seceded from the party. The Martovites thus
6l
lost five very important votes.
Lenin was quick to take advantage of this windfall.
He immc diately introduced a motion to dissolve Raboeiieo
Dclo as a foreign publication in order to give exclusive
''Vladimir Lenin, "An Account of the Second Congress,"
Selected Works . II, 356.
6°Ibid . T p. 350.
6lIbid . T p. 352.
7h
recognition to Iskra . Martov, being a loyal Iskraist, voted
for the proposed plan and lost two more votes. The Rabochee
Deloists now walked out. Lenin now had a majority of two
votes.
Martov was clearly no politician. In this instance
as in numerous others, he demonstrated that to sacrifice a
principle was worse than losing a battle. While Martov
might have compromised a conviction and voted for the Bundist
proposal, the 3undists themselves might be bla. a for political
shortsightedness too. Their walking out when th<y held a
strategic position in the coalition of Martovites and
Rabochee Deloists was not exactly brilliant.
Though it was not brilliant it was not opportunistic
either. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were to level this charge
against Martov, the Economists, and the Bundists, when, if
anything, Lenin vai the most opportunistic of them all. ^
When the Second Congress had ended, Bolshevism and
Menshevism were hardly "isms" in the sense of having a
distinctly formulated sets of beliefs, or oven a distinct
program for social democracy. This is not to say that
there were no differences, but rather that these differences
0<iVladimir Lenin, "An Account of the Second Congress,"
Selected Works . II, 356.
^Consider Lenin's continued use of the name "Bolshevik."
That was certainly op ortunism for it conveyed the idea
that Lenin was always in the "majority."
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were still too subtle to be expressed in concrete terms.
In the final chapter an analysis of these differences
will be presented in an effort to determine Martov's Jewish
influence on llenshevism.
CHAPTER IV
MARTOV, MENSHEVISM, AND THE JEWISH INTELLIGENTSIA
A CONCLUSION
In 1907 Stalin, reporting on the London party congress,
wrote:
Statistics show that the majority of the
I-fenshevik faction consists of Jows—and this of
course without counting the Bundists—after
which come Georgians and then Russians. On the
other hand, the overwhelming majority
of the Bolshevik faction consists of Base -ns.T?
or this reason, one of the Bolsheviks observed
i jest (it seems. Comrade Alexinsky) that the
nsheviks are a Jewish faction, the Bolsheviks
genuine Russian faction, whence it wouldn't
be a bad idea for us Bolsheviks to arrange a
pogrom in the party.
1
The number of Jewish revolutionaries in the Menshevik party
was certainly very great. This could hardly have been
accidental. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to de-
termine how much, or what parts, of the l-fenshevik program
was a direct result of this Jewish influence. It will be
shown, therefore, that Martov's interpretation of social
democracy after .he Second Congress was consistent with the
overal attitudes cf the Jewish Intelligentsia as expressed
-Cited in: 3ertram Wolfe, Three Who Hade 1 ^ol tion .
p. «f6o. Shapiro's figures for the sameCongress show that
the Jewish delegates numbered about 100, or roughly one
third of all the delegates when the 57 Bundists "are included.Over one fifth of the delegates who followed the Menshevik
line were Jews, as against one tenth of pro-Bolshevik
delegates. L. Shapiro, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian
XL
V
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1Onary Hovenent >" Slavonic 3H& Bast European Review T
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earlier In his career.
In September, 1903 the Mfensheviks held a five day-
conference at which an attempt was made to form .late some
doctrinal basis for their position in the debate with Lenin.
Martov and Trotsky then announced the resolution!
Considering that at the Second Congress of
our party there evidently triumphed, in a number
of questions, a tendency to change radically the
former tactics of Iskra and to place the juridical
strengthening of the power of the new editorial
board over the ideological-training and the
ideological-organizing role of the paper, con-
sidering that thi?; tendency was expressed in the
creation of a Soviet which constitutes solely a
transmission mechanism of the administrative power
of the new editorial borad of Iskra and an Instrument
of its tutel- ge over the Central Com ittee, which
relegates the latter to the role of a simple
servicing technical apparatus; considering that
this sort of action fflttst inevitably split the
party into an arbitrarily s .scted, self-enclosed
central organization on one hand, and a Hide broken-
down mass of Social Democratic workors on the other,
compromising thereby the very concept of a single.
centralized, and fighting party, we recognize that
in the interest of the preservation and consolidation
of unity in our party, we must wage an energetic
and principled struggle again I ;e tendency of
deformed centralism characterized above, and prepare
public opinion for a Third Congress.
2
This declaration expressed a doctrinal position of
sorts, but a negative one. It embodied itertov's concept
that the '.:orker should maintain his samodevatel 'nost
'
. his
independent initiative or spontaneity, yet the resolution
was stated in a negative manner. It was a declaration
^Yuri I-lartov and Lev Trotsky, "Resolution about our
Current Tasks in the Intra-Party Struggle," Leninskii
Sbojaiik, VI, 205.
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against the ''mechanism" of the Bolshevik centralist tendene
,
it was against the reduction of initiative of the party-
members, it was against disunity of t -ty, mt it did not
express what it was for.
After considerable debate between Lenin and Martov in
the revolutionary press and later taring the Congress of the
League of Social Democrats Abroad, Ifcrtor** arguments finally
struck at the roots of the controversy. In a speech before
the Congress he said:
Of thfl op osed organisational tendencies,
one is expressed in the statement made by Lenin
itterday that "the wider the movement the wider
already the organisation," and in the argument of
his 'artisans at the congress that ur version of
Paragraph One brings opportunistic intelligenty
into the party; the second is expressed in the effort
not to permit the strongly c -nsniratorial and nec-
essarily narrow organizations of professional revo-
lutionaries to tear themselves away from the masses
of active fighters, from the conscious wor Btlng
under the leadership of our committees
. ... In our
eyes, an organization on the whole constitutes an
autonomously formed and secure collectivity.
3
"An autonomously formed and secure collectivity" is
what the Jewish 3und had been arguing since 1901. The
history of the Bund after the Second Congress parallels the
history of the Menshevik party very closely. As Leonard
Shapiro wrote: "Each group was attempting to uphold the
same kind of principles of social democracy which it believed
Vladimir Lenin, Selected Works, II, Mf3. The
speech exerpt was quotod in Explanatory Notes by the
editors.
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in danger of being destroyed by Lenin,"
What were these principles? What is entailed here is
an interpretation of Marxism v/hich liartov and t le Jewish
intelligentsia held in common. This interpretation may oe
said to include: (1) the creation of a broadly based
democratic revolutionary workers' party, (2) the assertion
that the liberal bourgeoisie must first o.rrthrow the re-
actionary ai^tocracy before the proletarian stage of the
revolution could begin, (3) the belief that t: volution
must be internationalist in character. In all the debate
between Lenin and Martov, there is no reference to these
principles, yet it was these principles that were behind
the squabble over party ogr.nization.
In the period of 1905-1907 the revolutionary atmosphere
was free of most restraints formerly imposed oy the police.
The revolutionaries came out of their underground world and
conducted their activities in the open. The Social Democrats
for the first time could vote and elect their leaders without
fear of the Okhrana.-' The organizational lifferences which
had cau ed the split In the party were discussed lightly.
^Leonard Shapiro, "The :tole of the Jews in the .lussian
Revolutionary Movement," Slavonic and East European Review T
XL, l6o.
'Isaac Deutscher, Tjje. Prophet Armed (London: Oxford
University Press, 195*0 > P. 1.37.
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Lenin even agreed with Martov that the com :ittees of the
6
party should be elected from be ow and not from above.
Before the end of the year 1906, the two factions were on
the road to unification. Complete reunion could possibly
have ^eien achieved had not a drastic change in the revolu-
tionary move, it taken place. On June 3 5 1907 the tsar
Hicholac II reverted to reaction. The Duma was dissolved
and for all intents a; *poses the revolution had ended.
After the revolution of 190? began, Martov in Surcpe
and Potresov in Rur.sia became convinced that the only ray
the workers could take their place as a »fal force in
the complete overthrow of autocracy was to build a mass
party organization. The failure of the revolution had
indicated that Russia was far from a mass organization and that
trade unionism with its emphasis on strl 3 and demonstrations
t be developed to their fullest extent.' Martov 1 s con-
ception of the party's role in this activity was based even
more on the prir B outlined in Ob Agi^atsja. By
utilizing such opportunities as the semi-constitutional
Duma set up in I906 Martov felt that the workers' con-
sciousness would continue to grow and that "upon this . -
sciousness alon» M the party could be based. ° In a letter
^rlad: :;".r Lenin, Goehpneniva . X, 15-21.
^Vladimir Lenin, Socheneniva t XII, >+l+7-1+!*8.
SIbid . T p. 1*1+1.
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to Aksel'rod in 1906 Martov wrote: "We shall strive to bring
about a change in the composition of the leading bodies,
which will secure to the party the possibility of working
freely towards its own enlightenment. "° By "working freely"
Martov implied that all restrictions, all obstructions to the
attainment of the workers' Sv-'f-consciousness and independent
initiative had to be removed. The Social Democratic party
had to be an independent party, free from the interference
of the liberal bourgeoisie, who Martov had always eyed
suspicion, -ly. The pa. ty had to be free from such groups
who "misunderstood the character of the historical process
and the nature of the workers 1 needs," as Martov said.
What was this historical process? To Martov, this
process was embodied in the Marxian argument that a. bourgeois
revolution must precede the socialist revolution. Granted
Russia had not witnessed the development of a consc ous
bourgeois society, Martov argued, but the successes of the
bourgeoisie during the early stages of the revolution indi-
cated the growth of this consciousness, and the democrati-
zation of all society, as Marx predicted, seemed to be
realized in the creation of the Duma. •*• Lenin would argue
^Pavel B # Aksel'rod and Y. 0. Martov, "Pis'ma P. 3.
Aksel'roda i Y. 0. Martova," ArkJUY BMlfaJ Revolvutsii. I, if.
10lbi!i., I, 6.
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Tread|old » ^& M& His. Rivals (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 19557, p. 181-18?.
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that Russia could skip the bourgeois stage of the revolution
and establish a dictatorship of Lie proletariat. The only
conditions necessary for the triumph of the proletariat was
a strong working class movement led by loyal and devoted
communists once the proper economic level of the country had
been reached. 12 Russia's his to. leal development, Lenin
argued, did not demand the process described by Marx. ^
The task of social democracy for Martov then w s to
encourage and aid the bourgeois victory over the tsarist
recime. This involved, of course, the possibility of a
bourgeois hegemony on the activities of the proletariat, but
Martov was willing to take the risk. In spite of his doubts
on the political reliability of the liberal bourgeois move-
ment, Martov wrote to Aksel'rod that the support given by
the "conscious" proletariat would be sufficient for it to
gain its legitimate ends. In the same letter he wrote: "The
proletariat will prevent any halfway compromise through its
pressure upon the bourgeois opposition, through the strength
of its influence over the laboring masses, and thanks to its
consolidated and independent political position."
Martov 's idea of the historical process was becoming
more clear with every publication, with every letter. The
12Donald Treadgold, Lenin and His Rivals . p. 156.
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"Pavel B. Aksel'rod and Y. J. Martov, "Pis'ma P. B.
Aksel'roda i Y. 0. Martova," Arkhiv 3ussko5 Revolvutsii
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coming revolution was to be a bourgeois democratic revolution.
It would abolish the feudalists state structure, clear the
wafr for the free growth of capitalism, establish a democratic
republic, and bring the bourgeoisie to power. Once this
republic had established itself, Martov wrote in 19061
...There would be open x , ""itical life, freedom to
propagate socialist ideas, to organize the working
class politically and economically and develo in it
the culture, experience, self-consciousness and power
necessary to prepare, at some future date, a second
revolution, a socialist revolution. That revolution
could be democratic only when the proletariat should
become a majority of the population. But the
proletariat in its present condition in this back-
ward land could not dream of takinc power, nor should
the Social Democratic Party entertain the idea of
entering into the provisional government. Since it
could not secure the enactment of its own program in
so backward a country, it would only compromise its
program and itself by taking responsibility for the
actions of a bourgeois government. To be revolu-
tionary now means to fight tsarism, to support the
bourgeoisie in its struggle for power, to encourage
it and push it and exact from it the promise of a
maximum of freedom for the v/orking class. 15
The following year Martov 1 s enthusiasm had understandably
cooled, but he maintained his belief that a bourgeois revolu-
tion would still come. The 1905-1907 revolution, Martov
said, had proved not to be the bourgeois revolution Marx
had predicated but a "step backward towards the feudal
nobility. MXO Hence he denied the charge, advanced by Lenin,
that the bourgeoisie had "deserted to the side of counter
1?Y. Martov, Leninskii Sbornik. VI, 218-219.
Vladimir Lenin, Selected Works
.
IV, 367. Quoted in
Explanatory Notes of the 7"ditors.
revolution," and was supporting the autocracy* ' The job of
the proletariat was nov to " the liberal bourgeoisie
Into this fight* lartov then argued that, because of the
timid nature of the liberals, the party should be careful
not to "frighten the bourgeoisie by making excessive demands."16
To this statement Lenin responded by name-calling* The
term "llquldationlsm* was leveled at Martov and many of his
Msnshevik colleagues* The word "llquidatloniSB" was actually
meaningless, in tils writers opinion, but beoau e nine-tenths
of the liquids ionists were Jews, It may be helpful to under-
stand Martov t s brand of liquidationisra*
During the revolution of 1905-1907* while agitation was
conducted freely, a number of Kenshevlks disavowed the
underground tactics previously employed by the party* Lenin
charged that they wished to "liquidate" the underground
organization entirely* Martov himself was not convinced
of the necessity for a strict and secret party though he
never thought of liquidating the underground network* In
an essay entitled i "Is this the light Way to Prepare,"
'lartov clarifies his standi
17Vladlmir Lenin, 3olect*vi wor -.. iv, 367* Quoted in
Explanatory Botes of the Editors*
l%he fact that nine-tenths of the liquidators were
Jews was an approximation given int L* Shapiro, "The Sole
of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement,"
>.- .' " Cot "t:c gjgj : •vi i-v T XL, r'l.
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The more the understandin of the current political
tasks of our Party becomes narrowed in the minds of
some comrades, and the mere they are inclined in practice
to put up pas:ively with the "poverty and imperfection"
of our day-to-day work and of its astounding backward-
ness—by no moans less astounding than in the days of
Econornism—as compared with the demands put forth by
the spontaneously insurgent masses, the more exclusively
are th^ir thoughts directed towards that luminous point
which they visualize as an insurrection manufactured
by them in the unde g-'our^. of a "strict?.- secret
organization" and "set in motion oy order of an all-
powerful center. "20
Martov* s tendency to endorse an uncontrolled social democratic
movement—bowing to spontaneity--./as thus expressed again, as
was his op; osition to what he called "Jacobinism, Blanquism,
and conspiracy in the Bolshevik camp."
Lenin* s accusation that Martov was a liquidaticnist was,
in the strict sense of the tern;, inaccurate. There was
another meaning whi ^h became a tached to liquidationism,
however. Openly pursuing the policy of supporting the liberal
bourgeoisie was interpreted by Lenin as liquidationism as
well. In his essay: "On to th» High Road," Lenin demonstrates
this point?
In the period of 1905-1907 the general political
line of the Mensheviks was the line of cooperation with
the liberal bourgeoisie and the subordination of the
revolutionary labor movement to the latter* As mirsued
by the liquidators, this line assumed the character of
subordinating the revolutionary labor movement to the
interests of the bargain which the liberal bourgeoisie
had already made with tsarism and of the pettifogging,
Vladimir Lenin, Selected Works T II, 560. Sxerpt
quoted in Explanatory Notes of the editors. Lenin's
secretive methods were noted by Martov in 1895. Ante, p,
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liberal reformist patching up of the regime which
hr»o established itself after the defeat of the
revolution of 1905-1907. 21
Martov, by sup orting the liberal movement, was a liquidator,
but in Lenin's viow an "inconsistent liquidator" for he
advocated the continuation of the underground activity of
22
the party.
The underground, as conceived by Martov, was to be a
skeletal affair upon which the party could fall back should
it be necessary. The main •aphasia was to be on trade
unionism. The Jewish Bund after 1903 was hardly more than
a trade union. The Bolshevik distrust of this type of
activity is certainly one of the reasons for the fact that
few Jews were in the 3olshevlk party. It is also the reason
why the Bolsheviks until I917 could not rally the workers to
the Bolshevik cause. Zinoviev in his party history of 1922
comments on this: "We did not win the trade unions until
after the October Revolution of 1917. Up till then the
Mensheviks had the majority there. The 'dictatorship of the
proletariat' had to be set up in 1917 against the will of the
organized proletariat."
An analogous difference in orientation is se^n in the
attitudes of Lenin and Ma-tov on the role of the Duma. 2-Iartov
2171adimir Lenin, "On to the High Road," Selected works
TIV, 7-8.
22Ibid .
t p. 11.
23C1ted ins Bertram Wolfe, Thjeo .vho l&de. & Revolution
,
p. ?22.
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was inclined to give more emphasis to parliamentary activity.
He saw in the Duma n opportunity for a "democratically
elected spokesman of broad masses of workers," capable of
forming a legal leadership for a "broad, legal labor party."
In the letter to Aksel'rod just quoted, iiartov reflected the
general attitude of the Jew: -h intelligentsia toward rep-
resentative institutions based on western democratic prin-
ciples. Bertram Wolfe's description of the Mens evik and
the Bolshevik representatives in the Duma substantiates the
difference in attitude when he wrot& that the Menshevik
leaders in the Duma were usually men of "high oaliber"
whereas the Bolshevik representatives were "all simple wcrk-
men lacking in self-confidence on the floor of the Duma." J
Martov did not lose faith in these principles in spite
of the Stolypin reaction. While abroad he edited the
Menshevik paper Golos Sotsial Demokrata where he continued
to influence the Menshevik program of "conciliation" v/ith
the bourgeoisie. To the demands of Parvus and Lenin for an
armed insurrection, Martov countered that an armed uprising,
lire a revolution at l&rg«, could not be organized against
the regime at this time—it would have to come .bout on its
own accord v/ith the growth of popular revolt. But first,
.artov insisted, the historical mission of the bourgeoisie
Pavel B. Aksel'rod and Y. 0. Martov, "Pis 'ma P. B.
Aksel'roda i Y. 0. Martova," ffrkhjLy Susskofl Revolvutsii t p. 9.
'Bertram Wolfe, Three Who Made a uevolutlon
T p. 53*+
•
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i.iust fat realized. "We have a right to expect," said Martov,
"that sober political calcula ion will prompt our bourgeois
democracy to act in the same way in which, in the past
century, bourgeois democracy to act in the same way in which,
in the past century, bourgeois democracy acted in western
Europe, uncler the inspire lc>. P rrwolutioi v romanti-
cism."26
The key phrase in the above quotation is "the way,.,
bourgeois democracy acted in veatern T1urope." All Marxists,
since the struggle with the Karodnlks . had seen their mission
as the "Buropeanization" of Russian social democracy. After
1907, if it had not been explicit before the, the Bolsheviks
and Monsheviks gave a different meaning to this term. Most
modern historians of the pre-revolutionary intelligent
tend to accept the view that in transplanting Marxism in
Russia, there were two distinct responses among the Social
Democrats. ** One response was tc emphasize the Europeanization
process in the party's organization and -.actios. The other
response was to Russify Marxism—to adapt it to the peculiar
histori levelopment of Russia. At leasttwo of these
histo.ians have presented a case for the argument that
Bolshevism, in its attempts to Russify Marxism went beyond
>6Cited in: Isaac Deutscher, Th£ Prophet Ariaed
T p. 119.
!
'For example: L. Halmson, M. Malla, L. Shapiro,
B. Elkin, I. Deutscher. '
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the western context of Marxism by combining Marxism with
Populism. Michael Karpovich has called attention to Lenin's
debt to Tkachev, the Naiwnik leader of the 1870* s. Richard
Pipes discusses the similarity in tactics between Bolshevism
and Populism in the emphasis both place on the seizure of
power by revolutionaries, the need for a tight professional
organization, and a mass peasant uprising to back the up-
rising in the cities.
^
Lenin's abandonment of the two central tenets of European
Marxism—the inevitability of capitalism and the need for a
bourgeois revolution—was probably more a result of experience
than a special affinity for Populism. Yet this experience
was a Russian experience and Bolshevism was therefore a
nationalistic experiment from the beginning. Lenin's denun-
ciation of the liquidators is a good example of this. The
liquidators attempted to justify their opposition to the
clandestine operations of the party in an endeavor to
Europeanize the Russian movement. European Social Democratic
organizations worked in the open and so should the Russian,
they argued. 3° In the Russian p lice state, especially
On
Michael Karpovich, "A Forerunner of Lenin: P. N.
Tkachev," Review .of. Politics T XXI (July, 19W .
^Richard Pipes, "Russian Marxism and its Populist
Background," Tjjg, Raglan, Rsylsw. XIX, 316-318.
3°Vladimir Lenin, "On to the High Road," Selected Works .
IV, p. if.
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under Stolypin, Lenin convincingly argued that western
socialistic practices simply could not, work. While Martov
agreed with Lenin on thij point and continued to support
the underground organization, their reasons were different.
An examination of Martov 1 s reason for defending the under-
ground activity of the party may clarify the dilemma which
he was to face in the years to follow.
Outside of the obvious reason for maintaining the
underground after the June 3 regime came to power (even the
liquidators retreated to the underground then), Martov had
a sentimental reason for embracing this "way of life."
The underground had a particular Dostoevskian flavor in
which Martov gloried. Martov 1 s romanticism has already been
described in Chapter le.^1 This romanticism seems to be
expressing itself here as well. The heroism, the martydom
of the underground, however, was countered by a Jewish idea
of Internationalism and the need to reform Russia alon,_
western lines. Martov therefore could not oppose the liq-
uidators who stood for westernization. Nor could he, with
his preference for the underground and his fear of a bourgeois
hegemony on the independence of the proletariat, become a
liquidator. The only course Martov could take was to avoid
the excesses of liquidationism, to suggest moderation and
carefulness to his Jewish liquidationist colleagues in their
^Ante, p. 20.
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association with the bourgeoisie, and defend their right, under
a democratic organization, to remain in the party.
Martov's brand of ^xism had a special appeal to the
Jewish intelligentsia, based as it was on a common experience.
First of all it seemed to be very different than Lenin's
distinctly Russian interpretation. It seemed to insure the
universality of the workin;- class, a universality which
precluded any racial or other discrimination. Jewish eman-
cipation, under Martov's formula, would be complete. The Jew
would be the equal of his Russian counterpart. As Leonard
Shapiro states: "Menshevism was an interpretation of Marxism
which found a particularly responsive chord in Jewish
traditions and temperament. "3 2
Temperament is I 1 important word in this discussion.
The difference in temperament between the Bolsheviks and
Mensheviks was becoming more and more apparent from the
Revolution of 190? until the outbreak of World War I. erhaps
Lenin had been correct when he called the Martovites "Soft
Iskraists" or "Iskraists of the Zig Zag line." It char-
acterized Ilartov as an idealist and his program for social
democracy as unrealistic. Were not the attitudes of the
Jewish intelligentsia in general idealistic? In their
identification with a *we«^rn" interpretation of Marxism—an
interpretation that did not ring of pogroms, reactionary
32Leonard Shapiro, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian
Revolutionary Movement," Slavonic ai& ^ast European Review .
A.L, 161.
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legislation, and general anti-Jewish sentiment—wore not the
Jews unrealistic? Their belli! that antl-Serdtism, whatever
its form, would disappear in a socialist state, and that
Jewish emancipation would be achieved not only in a legal
sense, but in a social 3f»nse as well, could not even have
been based on the experience of the Jews in Western Europe.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the
development of Martov's revolutionary career beyond the
1905-1907 revolution. The material already presented, how-
ever, offers us a clue to the fate of his little grour of
internationalists. The Bolshevik victory was not a victory
of internationalists. It was not a victory for the Jew.
Lenin would not even admit that the Jews were a nation.^
The thousands of Jews who flocked to the Bolshevik party
after the coup d*etat of November 7/8, 1917 were to be
disap ointed.^"
Today Martov seems to have been a prophet full of far-
sighted intelligence. He pointed out that the Bolshevik
proclamation of the Socialist republic and ignoring the
historical process contemplated by Marx would result in
something different than Marx expected.3? He pointed out
33se« Joseph Stalin, Mawtiam aM, Ihe, Fiftti °"Al
for the Bolshevik position on Jewish nationhood. Also*
V. Lenin, "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need and Independent
Political Party," Selected Works . II, p. 3^.
^Solomon Sohwarz, The Jew3 in the Sov^at Union r p, 1+1
3%. Martov, £he £fcajfce, ABA J2tt Sgfllallaft ftQYPlttUga*
(Mew York 1 International aeview, 1.936) , p. /•
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that the dictatorship of the proletariat which Marx and
Engels had described as having the form of a democratic
republic was not to be confused with the dictatorship of
the Bolshevik professional revolutionaries over the working
class. ° He foresaw that the pretention to a program of
world revolution "affected by the 3olsheviks during their
heroic period" served as a sort of camouflage to protect
their position, and would in time give way again to the
program of Russian "national socialism," the traditional and
real program of Bolshevism. '
By the end of 1920 there was no longer any place for
a man like Martov. Lenin personally (tinted him a passport
to go abroad, for despite their differences, Lenin had
always regarded Martov as a close friend. Krupskaya recorded
this feeling when she wrote:
It was exceedingly difficult for him [Lenin] to
break with Martov. Afterwards, Vladimir Ilyich
fought the iiensheviks, but every time Martov, even
in the slightest degree, took the correct line, his
old attitude towards him revived. Such was the case
for example in Paris in 1910, when Martov and
Vladimir Ilyich worked together on the editorial
board of the Social Democrat . Coming home from
the office, Vladimir Ilyich used to relate in
joyful tones that Martov was taking a correct line....
Later, back in Russia, how >leased Vladimir Ilyich
was with Martov's position in the July 1917 days;
not because it was of any advantage to the Bolsheviks,
but because Martov was acting worthily—as behooved a
^Y. Martov, The. State and the Socialist Revolution ,
p. 13. '
37
Ibid .
T p. 26.
9h
revolutionary. When Vladimir Ilyich was already
seriously ill he said to me somewhat sadly,
"Martov, they say, is dying too..., "3°
Martov died of tuberculosis in 1923 while living as a poverty-
stricken exile.
Unlike the American Negro "freedom rider" and his
fight for desegregation, or the Indian Sikh who participates
in a partition riot, Martov sought to dismiss his Jewishness
and become ft Russian. He would scarcely admit to being a
Jew. Yet through his entire career, Martov, consciously
or unconsciously responded to the demands of reality in
a manner that can only be described as Jewish.
This thesis has presented the arguraeii- fehftt Martov
was not only influenced by his own experience as an oppressed
Jew, but that he was influenced by the particul &r needs
of all Jewry—that it was these needs and not his own
personal needs that influenced his view of Russian historical
development. His adoption of an assimilationist outloc
may have been inspired by his education, but he hardly
acquired this emphasis by chance. In his education as in
his adoption of Marxism, there is sufficient evidence to
suggest that Martov believed that assimilation and socialism
was the best way to prepare for the emancipation of the Jew.
At Vilno Martov* s view of emancipation was altered in the
light of a real experience in the needs of his race. The
Cited in: Bertram Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution .
p. 252-253.
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organizational tactics he would endorse thus can be interpreted
as a direct result of this experience. This experience at
Vilno vas to supplement the rather unsatisfactory idea of
assimilation. Assimilation for Martov was never totally-
possible. Russia was really an alien land to him. Part of
this was probably due to the fact that he spent most of his
life abroad.
olution to Russia's problems and to the problems
of the Jews was thus seen by Martov as an internationalist,
democratic Marxism. Though ho would deny that this interpre-
tation of Marxism was Utopian, it was.
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As an interpretive essay on the complex of ideas that in-
fluenced the revolutionary position and activities of Yuri
Osipovich Martov, this thesis attempts to explore certain fac-
tors in the area of nineteenth century Russian intellectual
history which can be indentified as part of Martov's
Weltanshammp or world view. That Martov was an Intelligent
and thus an heir to the Russian intelligentsia tradition can
be shown in the way he interpreted and defined the nature of
man and the character of Russia's historical development.
Equally discernible are the intellectual categories, the con-
cepts, the basic assumptions which Martov held in common with
the Russian intelligentsia. But Martov was also a Jew, and
like the impact of the intelligentsia^ experience in general
and Marxism in particular, Martov* s Jewish background was to
exercise a long lasting, if not a permanent, influence on his
view of the world and his role in the revolutionary movement.
Though it will not be argued that there is universal
Jewish way of looking at things, this thesis will show that
Martov was conscious of the long and tragic historical experi-
ence of the Jews in Russia and their struggle for emancipation,
and that this orientation made him lean toward certain kinds
of political solutions rather than to others, which impelled
him to perceive and respond to various changes in the revolu-
tionary climate in a manner which was recognizably Jewish.
Implicit in Martov's writings is the idea that the only
way the Jews will be emancipated is to become Russians, to
Russify their whole existence, and to join the "universal
struggling workers" in an effort to establish Marxian socialism
in Russia. For this reason, Martov repudiated the nationalist-
separatist movement among the Jews—including the attempt by
the Jewish Bund to become an independent organ of the Social
Democratic Party. Isolation of the Jews from the Russian
workers, to Martov, would only make emancipation more distant.
One of the fundamental categories which many of the mem-
bers of the intelligentsia recognized as the basis for all rev-
olutionary activity was the "consciousness" vs. "spontaneity"
conflict. Itartov's solution was based on his experience at
Vilno in the Jewish revolutionary movement. His pamphlet Ob
Agitatsia (On Agitation) combined both categories, but it was
a combination that leaned more toward spontaneity. This op-
posed Lenin's view that a devoted corps of professional revo-
lutionaries should emphasize "consciousness" and lead the
masses in a revolution.
At the Second Congress of the Party, The Social Democrats
split into two groups—the Mensheviks led by Martov, and the
Bolsheviks led by Lenin. The cause of the split went beyond
the seemingly academic squabbles of the two leaders. Martov 's
argument for an organization including the "entire combination
of the leading elements of the proletariat" was consistent
with the Jewish Intelligentsia view that the revolutionary
movement be a broadly based democratic affair on the order of
the social democratic movement in Western Europe. Martov 1 s
internationalism may be equated to this idea as well. As a Jew
he tended to support the international interpretation of
Marxism over the distinctly Russian interpretation advanced by
the Bolsheviks.
In sum ary, this thesis is an attempt to show that Yuri
Martov's program for social democracy was dictated by his ex-
perience as a Jew in a hostile world, and though he was to
waver from time to time, he tended to favor a revolutionary
movement that permitted a free and uncontrolled growth—a pro-
gram that would emancipate the Jew from the backward and op-
pressive autocracy.
